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GREENE, HEIMANN, HERBERG, THOMAS
REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A SYMPOSIUM

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HEIDEGGER'S PRIVATE RELIGION

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MORALITY AND MORALISM

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BOOK REVIEWS

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TO PROMOTE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRIST

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This symposium attempts to suggest the diversity of thinking about, and inspired by, its subject. It is occasioned by the recent publication of Volume II of the Library of Living Theology, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought.

THEODORE M. GREENE, *for many years Professor of Philosophy at Princeton and Yale Universities, is now teaching at Scripps College.* **EDUARD HEIMANN** *is Professor of Economics and Sociology at the New School for Social Research and also Lecturer in Christian Ethics at Union Seminary.* **WILL HERBERG,** *well known in the fields of labor research, sociology, and theology, is at present on the staff of Drew University Seminary.* **GEORGE F. THOMAS** *is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Religion at Princeton University.*

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DAVID I. MITCHELL *is a M.R.E. candidate and a student in the Program of Advanced Religious Studies. His home is in British Guiana.*

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Quadrangle Notes

During the Spring Months the Seminary community has been privileged to hear a number of visiting speakers. These include Dr. David McLennan of Rochester, Bishop Kenneth Riches of Oxford, Dr. Archibald Davison of Harvard, Principal Matthew Black and Dr. James Stewart of Scotland, and Dr. Kurt Thomas from Germany.

A number of new faculty members for next year have been named recently. Dr. John Baillie will return to the Seminary as Harry Emerson Fosdick Visiting Professor. Dr. Baillie is the Principal of New College, Edinburgh. The Henry W. Luce Visiting Professor of World Christianity for 1956-57 will be Dr. Aziz Suryal Atiya, now Director of the Higher Institute of Coptic Studies in Cairo, Egypt. Dr. C. Ellis Nelson will succeed Dr. Sherrill as Professor of religious Education and Psychology upon Dr. Sherrill's retirement in July, 1957. The new Director of the Missionary Research Library is Dr. Frank W. Price who is also Adjunct Professor of Missions at the Seminary. Besides those previously announced, the Religious Drama program will bring four lecturers to the Seminary: Miss Winifred Ward, Mr. John Mason Brown, Mrs. Chouteau Chapin, and Mr. Norris Houghton. Rev. David H. C. Read, Minister of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church, will be a Lecturer in Homilectics. Dr. John A. Hutchison of the Department of Religion at Columbia has been appointed Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion, and Dr. Hubert C. Noble of the National Council of Churches will hold the same position in the Religious Education Department. Six new instructors have been chosen, including Robert Lee, George Landes, Hugh B. Hall, Jr., Thomas F. Driver, Mrs. Nellie Speers, and Charles M. Nielsen. George A. Lee will be Research Assistant in the Social Sciences.

The latest construction work to add to the din, in what will be remembered as the noisiest year on Morningside Heights, is a project to air-condition the Library. It is hoped that this may be completed before summer arrives. Plans also call for installing eight-five study cubicles in the stacks, to be ready by fall. This will double the seating capacity of the reading room. Projected for many years, the work has been made possible through a gift of the James Foundation. It has necessitated moving the Sacred Music Library and clearing five hundred square feet of stack space in order to house the equipment. As a result of these changes, graduate students will have cubicles in the stacks. Such expansion has been necessary due to the fact that circulation of books has climbed fifty per cent since 1950.

One of the most interesting events of the year has been the presentation of Herman Melville's story Billy Budd in its dramatized version. Presented by Prof. Seaver and the students, it turned out to be one of the most provocative productions the Seminary has seen in recent years. The advent of the Religious Drama program next year promises a continuation of such experiments in communicating Christianity through dramatic forms.

Reinhold Niebuhr: A Symposium

My Reactions to Niebuhr

Theodore M. Greene

I have been acutely aware of Reinhold Niebuhr for several decades, and I have come to know him somewhat more directly in numerous meetings of small groups of philosophers and theologians in New York and Washington. It is my very great loss that I have never been privileged to know him intimately as a friend. Hence my anxiety that, in my criticisms of him, I may unwittingly be doing him a grave injustice.

First, a very sincere word of admiration and gratitude. For thirty years, while I was teaching in Princeton and then in Yale, Niebuhr's was the most challenging, provocative, prophetic voice we heard. All of us, faculty and students, "believers" and "non-believers" alike, turned out to hear him whenever he came to the campus to preach. The student conferences he led stimulated discussion and soul-searching that lasted for weeks. Few of us agreed with him completely; many of us were often baffled or outraged by what he said and, on occasion, by the way he said it. But we were fascinated by his amazing dynamism, impressed by his eloquence, moved by his patent sincerity, and, above all, challenged by the profundity of his insights and humbled by his

trenchant criticism of our culture and ourselves. Niebuhr was, without question, a most effective, and a most desperately needed, prophetic figure during these decades in academic circles throughout the country. He was, of course, no less effective in other communities, both secular and religious.

As he became better known and as his books and articles came to be more and more widely read, his total impact upon us steadily increased. I remember a colleague of mine in Princeton rushing up to me on Nassau street a few days after the publication of *The Nature and Destiny of Man* with the exclamation, "Ted, you *must* read this book. Here's a duplicate copy. I can't lend mine to anyone." My friend was what Niebuhr would call a liberal and a secularist; his excited response was typical of many of us. I am confident that the thought and the lives of many thousands of younger and older men and women all over the country have been profoundly affected by Reinhold Niebuhr — the preacher, the prophet, the thinker, the man, the dedicated Christian.

How has he affected us? First of all, as a gadfly, by challenging our "pretensions," exhibiting our "naivetè," pricking our "complacencies," blasting our "utopian delusions" — to use a few of his favorite epithets. Yet his impact has been so powerful because his witness was always positive as well as negative. His negative polemic shook us; his Biblically oriented affirmations gave us food for thought. He left us, in varying degrees, sadder and wiser men, humbler and closer to repentance.

He also brought home to us, year after year, the existential relevance of Biblical religion to our times — to our social institutions, our international involvements, our democratic way of life. He brought Biblical insights to bear, powerfully and inescapably, upon our corporate lives and social concerns. He challenged us weekdays as well as Sundays, socially as well as individually, economically and politically as well as theologically. He made us think and question and probe on many fronts; he provoked us and challenged us at every turn. He was what we desperately needed during these decades of alternating optimism and despair — a chiding, guiding voice, a ringing demand for humility and hope, a call for repentance and faith. For all this our profound gratitude!

Prophet vs. Philosopher

It is much harder for me to express, briefly and judiciously, my basic criticism of Reinhold Niebuhr. The prophet must, I suppose, alway be critical of philosophy; by the same token, a philosopher

is bound to be critical of the inevitable one-sidedness of authentic prophetic utterance. I venture to believe that *both* voices are needed, not only culturally but from within the Christian perspective. Let me state my case as bluntly as possible. I am, in contrast to Niebuhr, an unrepentant liberal, rationalist, and philosopher, and I am not persuaded that the liberalism, rationalism, and philosophy which I would espouse are inconsistent with, or irrelevant to, the authentic Christian Gospel.

Niebuhr has indeed unmasked many of the illusions and pretensions of historical liberalism. But the liberalism I would defend is more basic; it is, ultimately, a passionate faith in the irreplaceable value of free critical inquiry and of all our hard won freedoms associated with such inquiry. Despite all his diatribes against liberalism, Niebuhr is himself in large measure a product and a notable example of this liberal spirit. He himself indignantly repudiates the charge that he is a "neo-fundamentalist;" he is certainly not a "reactionary." Why, then, particularly in these days of world-wide totalitarian threat, does he not help us to redefine *true* liberalism more profundly and then *defend* it as an essential component of our precious Western heritage?

The liberalism I would defend is rooted in an ultimate faith in human reason — not in what Tillich calls man's "lower" or "calculating" reason but in a "higher" reason which in some measure reflects the Divine Logos. I willingly accept Niebuhr's critcisms of historical rationalism; I too believe that reason does not automatically produce virtue or insure progress or suffice to overcome human sinfulness. I also agree that God must be conceived as transcending, in His ultimate mystery, all humanly apprehensible "rational structures" in His universe. But I must also agree with those who insist, in apparent opposition to Niebuhr, that human reason at its creative and humble best is *not* opposed to authentic faith but is, rather, an essential component of this faith, and that cosmic order is *not* alien to the Divine Being but an essential expression of that Being. What Niebuhr should repudiate is not reason as such but man's perennial misuse of reason, not rationalism as such but a narrow limited secular nationalism, not rational cosmic structure but the complete identification of God with this structure, not ontology *in toto* but a one-sided or superficial ontology. I hope I am not the kind of rationalist whom Niebuhr so effectively castigates. My faith in human reason is a faith that God, in creating man and declaring His creations to be good, gave man a mind with which, and with which *alone*, he *could* and *should* really apprehend, and in some measure comprehend, the very nature of God Himself as the ground and source of all *authentic* "rationality." *Of course* reason can be misused; so can every human faculty, and so

can faith. But this does not justify an *ultimate* distrust of reason anymore than it justifies an ultimate repudiation of faith. Neither is infallible; neither is self-sufficient; but, by the same token, *both* are essential. Surely our task is to rely on reason not less, but more judiciously, as it is also our task to believe not less wholeheartedly, but in a more enlightened manner.

The Role of Philosophy

Many of Niebuhr's criticisms of philosophy are valid. Philosophers in our Western culture have indeed been guilty of the many sins of omission and commission of which Niebuhr accuses them. But when all is said and done, it still remains true that, human nature and reality being what they are, there is *no* substitute for philosophy as man's most resolute attempt to embrace the whole of reality reflectively, to the best of his ability. Niebuhr is careful to discriminate in the field of "religion" between more and less adequate perspectives and insights; his prophetic criticism of historical Christianity does not impel him to indulge in a wholesale suspicion of religion as such, or of the authentic Gospel. Why can't he be as discriminating in his censure of philopsophical doctrines and attitudes? Why can he not *champion* philosophic inquiry at its humble and powerful best, not as a substitute for religious faith or as a self-sufficient venture, but rather as an *essential component* of man's total response to God and His universe? Why start with so narrow a conception of philosophy that one is compelled to describe one's ultimate faith as unphilosophical or even anti-philosophical? I am an unrepentant philosopher because I believe that authentic "salvation" depends essentially (though not exclusively) upon authentic "insight" into ultimate reality. Life is more than knowledge, but the good life, conceived of in *Christian* terms, is life rooted in wisdom, and wisdom *must* be ontologically oriented and epistemologically tested. Again I agree with those who believe that Niebuhr's witness would be greatly strengthened, not weakened, by a more adequate epistemology and ontology, in short, a more constructive Christian philosophy.

I very much wish, therefore, that Niebuhr would seriously reconsider his present conception of "What line the apologetic venture of the Christian Church should take."[1] Why need "personality, whether God's or man's, [be] defined *only* in dramatic and historic encounter" and not *also* ontologically? How can man's "radical freedom" possibly be divorced from his essential (ontological) nature or from the larger Reality (ultimate ontological Being) which confronts him? I, for one, do *not* ask for "speculative proof" of the "truth in Christ," but I

do ask, as do many others, for the best speculative comprehension of this truth available to mortal man. Why *assume* a radical dichotomy of "the encounter between God and man . . . by faith and love" [*LLT*, p. 21], on the one hand, and, on the other, man's most reflective use of his cognitive powers? Niebuhr himself bewails the "obscurantist attitude towards the disciplines of science and philosophy" as a "recurring evil in Christianity." I would, in all humility, plead with him not to encourage this attitude inadvertently by his sweeping attacks on liberalism, rationalism, and philosophy.

One last request! It is the characteristic failing of the prophet to stress prophetic diagnosis and prescription at the expense of the "love, joy, and peace" of religious assurance. All of us who have benefited so greatly from Niebuhr's prophetic utterances might benefit even more, right now, from an equally eloquent account of the "love, joy, and peace" of the Gospel. A book by Niebuhr on this theme would be the perfect and logical summation of all that he has done for so many of us.

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[1] Quotes from *Library of Living Theology*, Vol. II, p. 20

Niebuhr's Pragmatic Conservatism

Eduard Heimann

Professors John Bennett, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Kenneth Thompson in their instructive contributions to the Niebuhr volume of the Library of Living Theology trace the development of Niebuhr's social and political philosophy from radical beginnings to a pragmatism which finds its proper application in an authentic conservatism, however unique it is because of its context. The profundity and incredible richness of Niebuhr's insights into human aspirations and motivations protect him from the familiar pitfalls of upperclass conservatism. But conservatism it is, the logical destination of a pragmatist. For if we change what no longer works as far as is necessary to make it work again, then this is preservation by means of change, change for the sake of preservation. It is in this sense the principle of responsible statesmanship, supremely aware of the dangers which always threaten the life of society, and of the logical priority of pre-

servation (through some change) over improvement (through more ambitious but more hazardous change).

It is true that Niebuhr himself — as well as his antagonist Dewey — originally conceived of pragmatism in a very different way. For both pragmatism had been the philosophical framework for an analysis of present-day society in Marxian terms, leading to the conclusion — in the 20's and 30's — that rapid historical change had made the old order of things unworkable and demanded a fundamental overhauling of the entire structure. It is on this basis that the Dewey-disciple Sidney Hook went so far as to present Karl Marx himself as a pragmatist, whose dialectic and other hobbies did not really matter. An economic interpretation of history is pragmatic almost by definition. In this sense one can say that Niebuhr's early socialism and his present-day conservatism are, both of them, adequate practical applications of his basic pragmatism to changing situations; it is not he who has changed but America.

The Pragmatic Approach

Nevertheless, in writing this I feel rather uneasy. If revolution comes under the heading of pragmatism, what then remains outside? There is a way of stretching a notion until it loses all distinctiveness. Thus, if martyrdom is interpreted as that which the martyr covets because he happens to be built that way, what then remains outside hedonism? The pragmatist or the hedonist may deliberately choose such generalizing definitions in order to prove that their respective keys fit all locks. But the price of generality is emptiness, inarticulateness, irrelevance. It is true that there is a conservative element in the Hegel-Marxian dialectic, but Marxism is an "inexorable" law of revolution, and pragmatism is conservative.

I do not say that pragmatism is conservatism; it is only conservative, preserving that which happens to exist, and loses its applicability when that which exists cannot be preserved. Thus — error of judgment or not — Niebuhr was a Marxist when he thought that the American order was untenable and the New Deal ineffective. Or suppose our historical-sociological diagnosis teaches us that it is secularization which corrodes the foundations of Western civilization and necessarily divides it into two ideological and political camps, does it follow that re-Christianization must be introduced for reasons of pragmatism, "social engineering", expediency? What does follow is that pragmatism presupposes a given and somewhat stable structure and improves its operation but cannot explain the structure itself. America is pragmatist but so is the Soviet Union today: Marxist struc-

ture and strategy are constantly revised and readapted pragmatically. This is what neither Niebuhr nor his three critics have seen.

Anyway, both Dewey and Niebuhr are pragmatists for America. But Dewey is nothing but a pragmatist, the most unphilosophical of all philosophers, philosophizing as he does only within the given structure and hence establishing "intelligent adjustment" as the supreme norm; while Niebuhr has become an—always highly critical, even "ironical" —conservative in a special situation where he feels that this country has achieved a tolerable minimum of social and political stability by balancing interdependent powers against each other (governmental intervention against free enterprise, big labor against big business, executive against legislative, Republicans against Democrats, etc.) This order Niebuhr accepts because it is not only workable, responsive to changing pressure, and thereby adjustable, but also because it thus approximates the social justice which links his political views to his theology; precisely as it is for reasons of theology, not of pragmatism, that he rejects the Soviet order. In other words, outside and above his pragmatism he does have his incomparably rich arsenal of Christian standards of judgment, whose transcendence precludes the claim to sanctity of any institutional incorporation, and whose absolutism protects his institutional pragmatism from the moral frailty of any unprotected relativism. Pragmatism cannot be a principle; and for Niebuhr it is not.

Where Pragmatism Is Inadequate

But then, whether and when to use the pragmatic approach is a question of judgment in concrete situations. It is here that I emphatically disagree with Niebuhr himself as well as with his three friendly critics. They all seem to be at one on the stability reached in American public life, which would make the pragmatic approach applicable; and they also seem to be seduced by pragmatism's philosophical ambition into considering the pragmatic approach a matter of personal maturity though this may be unfair to Professor Thompson, since he refers to Burke's notion of prudence, which does not simply coincide with conservative pragmatism but far exceeds it in scope). Pragmatic judgment where it fits may be a matter of personal maturity, but it certainly is a very grave and dangerous error where fundamental problems of structure demand solutions. I do not think that, though given a peaceful future and a successful avoidance of depression, the position of America is reasonably stable: I think it is highly unstable in long range perspective, both in the domestic and international scenes.

The domestic reason is precisely in the triumph of American dynam-

ics based on rising productivity. The American system cannot be kept going except by rapid expansion; it cannot be stablized on any given level but is forced by its physical structure constantly to grow lest it fall back. For in order to be employed, the equipment-making industries (the heavy industries) must receive orders for equipment at least equal to those in the past, when they had to build, in rapid sucession, industry after industry, which then began to pour out more and more goods. Thus we have to expand because the industries in charge of making the means of expansion can be kept employed only be expansion of other industries. But then the constantly swelling flood of goods can only endanger the organic health of our souls as the alternative to the unemployment which threatens if we refuse to expand. This is a long range structural problem beyond the reach of any pragmatic approach. The problem, formidable in ramification, extends far into the international scene, too.

In addition, the international scene presents a further grave structural problem unknown at home. In any integrated and historically unified, even though stratified, society there is some certainty that additional wealth accumulating at the top will soon spread downward too (through higher demand either for personal services on the part of the poor or for enlarged production). That is, the rich, while buying more goods than the poor, will still leave enough, and have more produced, for the poor to live on. In other words, the percentual distribution of income, as the total rises, and the wealth spreads downward, tends to remain unchanged. But there is no organic relationship in the *world* market between, for example, growing American purchasing power and Indian purchasing power. As America gets richer, this does not automatically help India. As America buys all the paper demanded by her advertisements, her "funnies," and her tidy brown paper bags to carry vegetables home, not enough paper remains for India to print mass editions of anti-Communist literature—supposing such exists—to counter the mass invasion of ten and twenty cent editions in all Indian languages of the Communist classics. The rich snatch away what the poor need, and they may refuse to buy what the poor must sell in order to make a living. This structural maldistribution of incomes between nations, partly a legacy of colonialism, is what Nehru calls economic imperialism. It is not a problem to be dealt with pragmatically. Conservative pragmatism turns out to be applicable only in the interstices between structural problems, of which there is no dearth in this period of history.

This qualification, while indispensable in my opinion, is not meant to deny the credit due Niebuhr for his Christian pragmatism nor the critic's profound gratitude for it. Coming from the desperate, ever

futile search for the Christian system of government and society, one finds himself lifted to the plane of Christian freedom as he is taught by Niebuhr's Christian pragmatism to take the institutions of the world fully as seriously as they deserve, but not more seriously than that. And the impression of the doctrine is reenforced many times by the personal impression of Niebuhr's sovereign freedom of judgment in the midst of all the struggles in which he feels so passionately committed. Nay, if pragmatism is not the adequate approach to problems of fundamental structure, even there its message of warning against dogmatism should never be lost. In this sense, it is still true that, not pragmatism in general, but Niebuhr's Christian pragmatism, is an indispensable element in the store of Christian wisdom.

Christian Apologist to the Secular World

Will Herberg

"I cannot and do not claim to be a theologian," Reinhold Niebuhr states in the "Intellectual Autobiography" that forms the opening chapter of the volume on himself in The Library of Living Theology. "I have taught Christian social ethics . . . and have also dealt in the ancillary field of apologetics." These words of genial self-depreciation have their deeper truth, for the immense influence that Reinhold Niebuhr has wielded upon his contemporaries has come not from any attempt at theological system-building, but from his continuing efforts over three decades to develop a profound and realistic social ethics, and to "defend and justify the Christian faith in a secular age." No case is typical, and yet every case is revealing; it is in terms of the impact that Niebuhr has had upon my own life and thought that I can best communicate what he has meant to the large numbers whom he has reached, not through seminary and church, but in fields of secular life at first sight so remote from religion and its special concerns.

My first encounter with the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr came in the later 1930's. I was then at a most crucial moment in my life. My Marxist faith had collapsed under the shattering blows of contemporary history—there is no need to retell a story now grown familiar. I was left literally without any ground to stand on, deprived of the commitment and understanding that alone had made life livable. At this point, in a way I cannot now remember, I came upon Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. It is easy today to see the weaknesses of this early work; it is much more difficult to recapture its impact upon one in my position. It came with the revelation of a new understanding of human existence in terms of which I might reconstruct my life and thought. What impressed me most profoundly was the paradoxical combination of realism and radicalism that Niebuhr's "prophetic" faith made possible. Here was a faith that transferred the center of its absolute commitment to what was really absolute—the transcendent God—and was therefore able to face the real facts of life unafraid, with open eyes. Here was a faith that called into question all human institutions and institutional vested interests, that permitted nothing of this world to parade as final or ultimate, and yet provided an intelligible ground for discriminate judgment. Here was a faith that warned against all premature securities, yet called to responsible action. Here, in short, was a "social idealism" without illusions, in comparison with which even the most "advanced" Marxism appeared confused, inconsistent, and hopelessly illusion-ridden.

How much of this I got from *Moral Man and Immoral Society* and how much from other of Niebuhr's writings then available—for I promptly read all I could get hold of—I cannot now say. What I do know is that this "meeting" with Niebuhr's thought—I did not yet know him personally—quite literally changed my mind and my life. Humanly speaking, it "converted" me, for in some manner I cannot describe, I felt my whole being, and not merely my thinking, shifted to a new center. I could now speak about God and religion without embarrassment, thought as yet without very much understanding of what was involved.

It was not merely a matter of social philosophy, I soon discovered, though that is where it began. Deeper problems of the nature of man and the structure of human existence were to emerge, but the 'leap" had been made. Every work of Niebuhr's, almost every article he wrote, enlarged my understanding, deepened my insight, perhaps even confirmed my faith. *The Nature and Destiny of Man* marked the high point at this stage. When some years later I got out my work of

theology (*Judaism and Modern Man: An Interpretation of Jewish Religion* [1951]), it was avowedly Niebuhrian in temper and thought.

Perhaps I had better now drop the quasi-autobiographical form of these comments, but not before I point out that I was not alone in experiencing the impact of Niebuhr's thinking at this time. Many of my acquaintances in labor and radical circles testified to the relevance of his "apologetics," some eagerly, others reluctantly, but all with wonder and respect. His prominence in "liberal" causes, his realistic understanding of politics and social issues, above all his early and sophisticated anti-Communism, won him an audience among those in the secular world no other theologian of the time could reach.

The mood of the time was (to quote Malcolm Cowley's words) "a general dismay at the results of five centuries of progress and widening enlightenment." What had gone wrong with man and with history? Niebuhr's answer to these questions came with his rediscovery of the classical doctrine of "original sin," which religious liberalism and secular idealism had combined to deride and obscure. He pointed to the radical ambiguity residing at the heart of every human enterprise, and showed that every achievement of human virtue and rationality bore within itself an element of evil and unreason, which was bound to become demonic precisely to the degree that it was ignored or written off. He uncovered the frightening consequences of human pretensions to establish the Kingdom of God within history by ascribing finality and perfection to historical institutions, structures, and programs. It was modern man's utopian illusions, and his overweening confidence in his own power to "remake the world," that had led to the protracted crisis of the twentieth century. History, as neither bourgeois liberalism, the Social Gospel, or Marxism could understand, was not its own redeemer; it remained ambiguous to the very end, "a tragedy in which all are involved, whose keynote is anxiety and frustration, not progress and fulfilment" (Schlesinger). For redemption, man—even modern science-wielding, history-making man—would have to look beyond.

Man's Nature

This kind of depth understanding of history naturally involves a depth understanding of man. The "nature" of man Niebuhr found in his unique dimension of freedom, in the capacity of the self to transcend all the coherences, whether natural, social, or rational, through which it is provisionally defined and in which it is provisionally enclosed: man is a "being forever surpassing himself infinitely"

(Pascal). Yet man is also a creature—relative, finite, incomplete. Out of this tension between man's self-transcending freedom and the inherent limitations of his creatureliness is generated that profound existential anxiety which is at once the mark of the human situation and the precondition of sin. Neither naturalism nor idealism can understand this predicament, for neither sees man in his entirety. Naturalism sees man as simply part of nature; idealism sees him as essentially free spirit or reason; actually he is a self embedded in nature, culture, and society, yet transcending all of these by virtue of the indeterminate possibilities of his freedom. This dimension of human existence which enables the self "to stand as it were above the structures and coherences of the world" Niebuhr recognizes as the "dimension of the eternal," for it is in this dimension of his being that man is driven beyond himself and enters into the dialogue with the divine.

Implicit from the beginning, it seems to me was this "dialogic" strain in Niebuhr's thinking, which has come to mature expression in his latest book, *The Self and the Dramas of History*. With acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Martin Bubor, Niebuhr there describes the self as "a creature which is in constant dialogue with itself, with its neighbor, and with God." The very texture of this threefold dialogue of existence is historical. Niebuhr would not go so far as Ortega y Gasset in asserting that "man has no nature, what he has is history"—after all, Niebuhr does stress the natural and social coherences in which human existence is embedded—but he would certainly go along with the Spanish philosopher in insisting that "to comprehend anything human, be it personal or collective, one must understand its history." This direction of Niebuhr's thinking, which seems to me both biblical and existential, has of course brought him into some conflict with the basic ontological outlook championed by Paul Tillich; the cross-controversy between these two friends and opponents, in the new Library of Living Theology volume and in the earlier volume in this series devoted to Tillich, makes fascinating reading. Where Tillich asserts that "all problems drive us to an ontological analysis," Niebuhr insists that "the human person and man's society are by nature historical, and the ultimate truth about life must be mediated historically." It is in this area that the real issue dividing the two great theologians is defined.

Even in the newer framework of his thinking, however, Niebuhr's original interest remains dominant. He is concerned with showing how out of the encounter of faith in the dialogic life, the possibility emerges of a courage and a vision beyond the resources of human wisdom and virtue, a courage and a vision that enable us to accept our limitations

and yet make the most of the creative potentialities of our being by seeing both in the larger perspective of the divine purpose. We see the folly of attempting to complete life and history through our own doing, and yet we recognize that our efforts and achievements have their significant place in a "larger plan" in which our fragmentary meanings will be completed in a way beyond our comprehension or control. In this confidence, we may live and work in full responsibility, without lapsing into either self-sufficiency or despair.

Another tendency in Niebuhr's thinking, this time on the political level, is brought to expression in his most recent book. As far back as 1944, in *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness,* signs of the essentially "conservative" cast of mind of this leading "liberal" could be discerned, for what is *The Children of Light* but a truly "conservative" defense of American democracy? Niebuhr's recent writings combine a more conscious and explicit formulation of this "conservatims" with an embarrassed repudiation of the term. Yet the fact itself cannot be denied. His devastating critique of the French Enlightenment as the cradle of "every error which infects a modern liberal culture in its estimate of the human situation, and [of] most of the errors which reached a tragic culmination in modern totalitarianism"; his bitter characterization of the French Revolution as the source of the illusions which have "produced despotism in the name of liberty, civil war in the name of fraternity, and superstitious politics in the "name of reason," are enough to indicate the basic direction of his political philosophy. Nor should we be surprised to see his earlier "prophetic" radicalism culminate in the "new conservatism"; there is an inner connection between the two, and no real reversal is involved. For the "prophetic" radicalism implied a radical relativization of all political programs, institutions, and movements, and therefore a thoroughgoing rejection of every form of political rationalism. Add to this a renewed emphasis on the historic continuities of social life, and Niebuhr's brand of "conservatism" emerges. It is manifestly not the conservatism of those who are called conservatives in American public life, but it is enough apparently to establish a kinship with Burke and to give Niebuhr a prominent place in all the recent histories and anthologies of the "new conservatism."

Influence in the Secular Disciplines

The sweep of Niebuhr's thinking has led him into many fields, and has driven him to take issue with the dominant tendencies in modern religion and culture. It has also brought his influence to bear upon

significant elements outside the conventional scope of the Christian theologian. The impact of his biblical-existential thinking on religiously concerned American Jews is apparent to anyone who is in touch with recent trends, and may be documented by such writings as A. J. Heschel's contribution to the Library of Living Theology volume, "A Hebrew Evaluation of Reinhold Niebuhr," and his book published earlier this year, *God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism.* Even more striking is the communication Niebuhr has been able to establish with many of the younger men in history and political science, of whom Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Kenneth Thompson—both have valuable essays in this volume—may be taken as typical. Niebuhr, on his part, gratefully acknowledges that of late he has had a particularly appreciative understanding from men in these secular disciplines, and I too can add my testimony from my own experience on the campuses of this country. This influence he attributes to the fact that "these disciplines are most critical of the illusions of our culture." Perhaps it is also due to the fact that the kind of theology he teaches seems to the men in these disciplines particularly near to their concerns and particularly germane to their problems. It is a theology that—as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. long ago pointed out—restates the basic insights of biblical faith "with such irresistible relevance to contemporary experience that even those who have no decisive faith in the supernatural find their reading of experience and history given new and significant dimensions." Perhaps, too, it may, with God's help, lead them to see "faith in the supernatural" in a new light.

Niebuhr's thinking in the past three decades has ranged far and wide over the areas of Western culture, yet he is no doubt right in saying that throughout he has "not strayed very far from [his] original ethical and apologetic interests." He has merely been able to make these interests take in all the major concerns of our time.

Niebuhr on Reason and Metaphysics

George F. Thomas

"Niebuhr's appeal as an apologist," writes Alan Richardson, "lies in his honest refusal either to rationalize the stark incoherences of human existence in some academic theory of metaphysical idealism or on the other hand to deny the basic coherences of our experience

in the interest of some irrationalist or existentialist view of the type which is nowadays so fashionable." (Library of Living Theology, Vol. II, pp. 221-222.) That Niebuhr does seek to avoid both rationalism in all its forms from Thomism to Liberalism, and the extreme existentialist irrationalism of Karl Barth can easily be seen from his essay on "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith" in the volume *Christian Realism and Political Problems.* That he does so because there are both "stark incoherences" and "basic coherences" in experience is also clear. However, the result is a view of the relation of reason and faith, philosophy and theology, which is rather complex and sometimes perplexing. It is no wonder that in avoiding the extremes of rationalism and irrationalism he lays himself open to attacks from both sides.

Niebuhr's attitude toward metaphysics has given rise to sharp criticisms from some philosophers and philosophical theologians. In an essay in the recent Library of Living Theology volume on Niebuhr, Paul Tillich takes him to task for holding an inadequate view of reason. Niebuhr's tendency to identify reason with discursive reasoning, Tillich argues, leads him not only to use paradoxical language unduly but also to attack ontology "as a way of reducing the dynamic-dramatic history of creation, fall, salvation and consummation into a static system which is determined by rational necessity" (p. 39). This is unfortunate, he thinks, since an emphasis on self and freedom is consistent with a philosophy of being and indeed requires such a philosophy (p. 39). For example, ontology does not remove the freedom of the self and make the drama of fall and salvation a matter of necessity. For there is "responsibility and necessity," freedom and destiny, in everything the self does, so that "both the individual and the universal character of man's estrangement from God are preserved" (p. 41).

Tillich's argument is persuasive, but it will hardly allay Niebuhr's suspicion of ontology. Although Tillich believes that his own ontology of polar opposites does justice to the dynamic as well as the static aspect of being, to freedom as well as destiny, and to self as well as world, many of his readers suspect that he is really in the camp of the monists and that for him God is ultimately only the impersonal ground of being, the self only an aspect of being, and freedom only an unfolding of necessity.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see why reason should not be able to develop a metaphysics[1] which is compatible with the Biblical revelation concerning God, the self, and its freedom. Of course, the reason of the unregenerate man cannot understand, much less demonstrate, the truths of the Gospel; these can be apprehended only by faith when confronted by revelation in historical events. But there

is surely no necessity for the philosopher to conceive of being as static or to deny the freedom of the self or to minimize the personal character of God. Indeed, modern philosophers like Whitehead have for some time been moving away from the static conception of being and emphasizing becoming or process, Bergson and others have stressed the freedom and creativity of the self, and there have never been lacking theistic philosophers who have conceived of God as personal. Among those philosophers of the last generation who have been working toward a metaphysics which will provide a more adequate philosophical basis for Christian apologetics, the names of F. R. Tennant, William Temple, Austin Farrer, and Charles Hartshorne may be mentioned.

As far as I know, Niebuhr has not shown much interest in these philosophical developments. Why? Doubtless the answer is to be found partly, as Tillich suggests, in the influence of Neo-Kantian philosophy and Ritschlian theology upon him. Kant's attack upon metaphysics has had a profound effect upon modern philosophy and theology, and there are passages in Niebuhr's writings which indicate that he has taken it very seriously. Thus, Niebuhr's view that the contradictions between times and eternity, becoming and being, tempt the philosopher into a premature resolution which fails to do justice to one or the other (cf. *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, p. 177), reminds one of Kant's doctrine that the reason falls into "antinomies" when it grapples with questions of cosmology.

Niebuhr's Objection to Metaphysics

However, Niebuhr's objection to metaphysics, at least in its classical form, is rooted primarily in his preoccupation with man, his peculiar status "both in nature and above nature," his selfhood, his freedom and sin, and his historical existence. "The whole realm of genuine selfhood," he says in the same essay, "is beyond the comprehension of various systems of philosophy" (p. 178). "In the Christian faith the self in its final freedom does not find its norm in the structures either of nature or of reason" (p. 182). Similarly, the concept of divine creation is a "mystery beyond both the natural and rational causalities" and has to be expressed in the idea of creation "ex nihilo" (p. 181). If I understand him correctly, he is saying that divine creation and human freedom must simply be accepted as facts — given in revelation and experience respectively — but that they cannot be explained by reason in any coherent system of concepts. This seems to me to be true, in the sense that there is a uniqueness in both divine creation and human freedom which makes it impossible to "explain" either of them by reducing it to something else or by deduc-

ing it from a system of concepts. Moreover, it may well be that the divine creation is most adequately expressed in mythical terms. But this does not seem to me to be fatal to metaphysics as such; it is fatal only to a rationalistic type of ontology which "explains" creation as a mere actualization of potential being, the individual self as merely a case of the universal, and freedom as merely an expression of necessity.

Closely related to Niebuhr's concern for divine creation and human freedom is his concern for the historic existence of man and the redemptive activity of God in history. "The philosophies which emphasize ontological categories, whether in naturalistic, idealistic, or mystical terms," he says in the Library of Living Theology volume, "annul man in his undoubted historic existence. Man is primarily a historical creature. He plays his role against some ontological background, but his real milieu is history" (p. 18). Both the affirmation that "God is a person" and the affirmation that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself," he maintains, "are absurd from a strictly ontological standpoint" (p. 19). For "personality, whether God's or man's, is defined only in dramatic and historic encounter" (p. 20). Here, again, Niebuhr seems to be thinking of a classical, *rationalistic* type of ontology. Although the Christian belief that "God was in Christ reconcling the world to himself" cannot be demonstrated by any metaphysics but must be established by faith and love in the encounter between God and man, there is nothing in the nature of metaphysics as such to prevent it from accepting the personal character of God.

I should like to suggest that, if Niebuhr would consider the more *empirical* type of philosophy which has usually appealed to British and American philosophers, most of his objections to metaphysics might disappear. In view of the strong empirical element in his own thinking about both political and theological problems, this suggestion might well be acceptable to him. In contrast to Barth, he is a Christian apologist who seeks points of contact with "human wisdom." Would his apologetic not be strengthened if he would make use of the metaphysical insights of philosophers like Temple and Hartshorne?

This seems to be borne out by the fact that in his Christian apologetic he repudiates the Barthian view that "there is no way of using experience to determine faith" and insists upon a "circular relation between faith and experience" (LLT, pp. 15-16). For example, his understanding of the Biblical faith about man was partly "prompted by the refutation of the liberal and Marxist faith by the tragic facts of contemporary history" (p. 9). It is precisely this empirical element in his thinking, in my opinion, which is the ultimate explanation of his rejection of rationalistic ontology. Such an ontology does not

seem to him to be in accord with the realities of experience. Would this objection be valid against a metaphysics based upon a more empirical method which stressed primarily conformity to experience as a whole rather than rational coherence?

The Empirical Method

The empirical method has usually been conceived so narrowly since the time of Hume that it has led many to philosophical Positivism or Naturalism. But there is no necessity of restricting experience to sense impressions and neglecting aesthetic, moral, and religious experience. Also, it is impossible to interpret experience without presuppositions; and every metaphysical theory rests upon a first principle which cannot be demonstrated. Yet the older empiricism failed to understand that insight and faith have important roles to play in the philosophical interpretation of experience. If the empirical method is to be adequate for the development of a metaphysical theory, these mistakes must be corrected. Seeking to be faithful to the bewildering diversity and complexity of experience, the empirical method prefers to leave problems unsolved rather than to adopt premature and simpli-

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fied solutions. Since it cannot attain certainty or finality in its conclusions, it can never produce an ontology like that of Tillich. Rationalistic minds can never be satisfied with such a method, because they demand that all problems be solved and that a coherent system consisting of certain and necessary truths be attained. But to a mind like that of Niebuhr the empirical method, when conceived in a properly broad way, has the great advantage over the rationalistic, that it recognizes the limitations of man's finite reason and is less likely to foster intellectual pretensions.

I have been privileged as a member of a theological group to discuss religious issues with Reinhold Niebuhr for many years. Like others who had been influenced by Liberalism, I reacted sharply at first against his attacks on Liberalism. I still think that he oversimplifies Liberalism and fails to do full justice to it. But I have come to realize that Liberalism, when it repudiates the insights of Augustine and the Reformers, is likely to gravitate towards Modernism and even Humanism. Moreover, Niebuhr has helped me to see the profundity of the Biblical doctrine of man's sin and redemption and its superiority over modern alternative views of man. Above all, he has made it clear to me that the Biblical doctrines do not have to be accepted blindly on the authority of the Church or the Bible but can be validated by their power to illuminate the facts of human existence. The secret of his appeal as a Christian apologist is that he has applied the Augustinian principle, "I believe that I may understand," to the doctrine of man and has shown how a faith which cannot be demonstrated by reason can yet be understood and confirmed by reflection on experience. For modern man may be prepared to accept a faith which he cannot prove by reason, but he cannot accept a faith which seems to him contrary to reason and unconfirmed by experience. If so, should Niebuhr not welcome the attempt, under the stimulus of Christian faith, to develop a philosophy which can provide a more suitable basis for Christian apologetics than the traditional ontology?

[1] Because of the associations of the word "ontology" with the traditional ontology of Aristotle, Aquinas, the German Idealists, and Tillich, it may be better to use the word "metaphysics" for what we have in mind.

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Heidegger's Private Religion

Richard J. Kroner

I

Martin Heidegger is one of the most peculiar and even self-willed figures in the entire history of philosophy, although the history of philosophy certainly does not lack strange and obstinate personalities. I can support this description by my own experience, having been a colleague of Dr. Heidegger for several years. We both taught philosophy at the University of Freiburg, Germany. Here we had a kind of philosophical society in which we met regularly with several other professors and discussed matters of common interest. I always felt the import of Heidegger's personality, but I could not fully explain this impression, since what Heidegger uttered seemed rarely to be important. He said very little in any case, and he never disclosed his own philosophical position. Today, however, looking back, I am reminded of Nietzsche's verse:

> He who will once have much to proclaim,
> Much will in silence shroud,
> Who must once ignite the lightning's flame,
> Must long remain a cloud.

I knew, of course, from talks with the students that his lectures fascinated them to an extraordinary degree. They were enthusiastic about the trend of his thought and highly praised his manner of expression. They were convinced that his philosophy offered an entirely new vision of the world, a vision as illuminating as it was exciting. They all agreed that Heidegger was the only teacher in Germany who adequately expressed the general mood of the German youth at that time. In addition to this they said he was the most methodical and sternly Scientific thinker they knew of. Many mentioned that his manner of speaking betrayed an intense gravity and an almost religious devotion.

Only much later, when we were no longer teaching at the same university and when the first volume of his work, *Being and Time* (*Sein*

und Zeit), had been published, did I fully realize the meaning of this impression. I understood in particular why they had spoken of the originality and penetration of his thought. This book indeed gives baffling new insight and presents to the reader a compelling logic as well as great persuasive power. If one considers that in the academic world of that period philosophy was almost exclusively taught in lectures on epistemology, logic, ethics, or aesthetics, it is astounding how boldly and self-assuredly Heidegger declared that such a division into various disciplines could not do justice to the most essential and authentic problem of philosophy. This problem, he insisted, is Being, undivided and all-embracing. I admit that I read his work with a breathless tension. I also used it as a textbook in my seminars at the University of Kiel. Although I never became a "Heideggerian" I could not escape being attracted by the unusual force of his thinking and way of speaking.

The Challenge of Death

What was most fascinating and startling to me was not so much his metaphysical conception of Being, but rather his thoughts about death and mortality. These thoughts seemed to be in the very center of his whole discussion. When I was a student, the Germans talked and wrote much about "Philosophy of Life," which Nietzsche especially had popularized, and it had been widely accepted in non-academic literary circles. Our university professors despised and severely criticized such a popular philosophy, telling us that it had no scientific value but merely stirred the emotions, and that a serious analysis could easily refute it. Heidegger, however, had transformed this philosophy of life into a philosophy of death and had furnished it with the solid defense of a critical method, thus giving it academic respectibility. In this new attire, this formerly rejected philosophy of life demanded greatest attention and the most careful study. Was Heidegger right with his gloomy vision? And how was it to be judged by an adherent of German idealism? Was this philosophy that dared to make death the dominating problem of a new ontology still philosophy in the traditional sense, or was it merely the manifestation of a revolutionary feeling aimed at arousing people?

Heidegger exalted death to the position of the highest judge of all human existence. He called the attitude towards death the best measurement of true human existence. Man is man precisely insofar as he knows that he has to die and lives his life in the light of this inward knowledge. Most people shun this knowledge either by not taking it seriously or by intentionally forgetting it, as if death were not in-

escapable, as if it were not the essential determinant of our whole existence, or try to escape its inevitable necessity through belief in immortality as if death were merely a kind of illusion, since in truth we survive it. In both cases death is deprived of its absolute claim to dominate human life. We deceive ourselves when we do not recognize its supreme authority over our lives. The only right attitude towards death which agrees with our true human existence would make us 'authentic' (*eigentlich*) in the deepest sense. That is to say, it would give each of us his own and only true self. As long as we try to shun death by fleeing either into everyday life or into an allegedly immortal life we are trying to escape ourselves. Then we falsify fundamentally our relation to Being and to Truth; we falsify our relations to our fellow men; we falsify the very meaning of our existence.

This existence is ours only because we are finite, and that means mortal. Death is the absolute end of our being—it ends all our striving and acting. Death confines the potentialities which we own and can develop. 'Everyday life' (*Alltglichkeit*) is defined by Heidegger as that life which covers up the authenticity brought about by our awareness of having to die. Everyday life closes rather than discloses our real relation to death. It fails to develop and to assure that kind of freedom and autonomy which alone is able to rescue the human self from the blind and dumb power of everyday life. Authenticity alone makes us individuals in the true sense, whereas the triviality of everyday life transforms each one into an exchangeable and anonymous 'everyone' who no longer has a personality of his own. Thus death is not that power which is to be dreaded and indeed is dreaded by most of us, but rather, if we regard and anticipate death in the right way, that is, when we do not fear it but recognize and affirm its reality, it is the wholesome and creative instance which presents to each one his own selfhood. Death challenges each of us to grasp the unique, irreplaceable and irrepeatable possibility to become entirely and unconditionally his own self, that is, this unexchangeable, incomparable, individual 'I' that ends in death.

Heidegger's Religious Concern

Although I do not use the words of Heidegger himself but try intentionally to render them into my own language, I nevertheless believe that I strike at the core of his thoughts. No one who knows his philosophy and who does not misinterpret it as a theory remote from life can miss the religious, or if you like, the anti-religious sound inherent in it. His philosophy is by no means a metaphysics which has no practical consequences. It is a message which concerns our concrete human life, a message either saving or threatening according to whether it is taken

as truth or untruth. No man can remain indifferent when he faces this new interpretation of the meaning and of the destiny of his own life. This is not merely a new theoretical ontology, but a religion which either is and remains Heidegger's private affair, or else must become the concern of every man. It is either a private religion or it is the charter of a new religion for all mankind. A third alternative does not seem possible.

Heidegger's own language can be employed to prove that I do not exaggerate or distort his position. Where he speaks about the effect achieved by this new interpretation of the meaning of life and death his style soars to an almost religious solemnity. He calls this effect *eine gerüstete Freude* (a thoroughly grounded and unshakable joy). We would apply such a phrase only in order to characterize a religious message like that of the Gospel rejoicing at the victory of Christ over sin and death. What the Gospel gives the believer, namely, forgiveness and eternal life, is in fact assured to us by Heidegger's message on another level and in another language. Of course Heidegger's own religion is not based upon events as is the Gospel, but rather it is founded upon intuition and understanding. It is a philosophical, a metaphysical, or if you like, a gnostic religion. I do not suppose that Heidegger was completely conscious of the vast consequences and of the huge claim contained in his philosophy when he composed and published his work, *Being and Time*, in 1927. He has in fact told me later, when I saw him again, that he had written his book in a state of inspiration within a couple of weeks. I did not hesitate to believe it, for the book really creates the impression of such an inner illumination. It was of course prepared by the intense labor of many years and by many lecture courses. Perhaps the religious or pseudo-religious meaning of Heidegger's book came only gradually to his mind. His development in fact has moved step by step on ever increasing scale in the direction of religious utterances. *Being and Time* still fully preserves, and with the greatest emphasis, the purely scientific intentions and methodical means of a philosophical 'treatise'. Perhaps this contrast between the scientific method and the religious enthusiasm is one reason why the book was and still is so attractive to the world.

Death presents to man not only the certainty of his uniqueness, selfhood and authenticity, but it has still another mission which even increases the religious effect of a resolute and victorious feeling: I am not merely enabled by the anticipation of my death to become aware of my innermost self; I do not merely acquire the courage to live my life in perfect freedom out of myself alone; rather, this certainty has still another and higher meaning. My end in death does not merely imply the temporal destruction and termination of my life which would make it fragmentary, but rather by anticipating death my life becomes

a whole. If I no longer believe in immortality, death is no longer a mere interruption or transition from one kind of life to another, but it becomes the inwardly prepared and expected conclusion which rescues my existence from the meaninglessness inherent in an endless duration. It is precisely finitude which alone can produce that ultimate meaning for which I am longing; finitude alone permits me to set a goal for my will and to live in accordance with that goal. The goal is the end, and the end so interpreted means the completion (*Vollendung*). My life then takes on the meaning of self-realization. Only then can I reach the goal of becoming "I myself," because only then do I know that I have a limited span of time in which to attain that goal. This consciousness makes me absolutely resolute and supports me with that deadly seriousness which corresponds with the seriousness of both life and death. If I were permitted to believe that an endless time were at my disposal for the realization of myself, I would not try to mobilize all my energies and potentialities in order to reach my goal. Thus my finitude, far from being a deficiency or a weakness, is the obvious symptom of the dignity of my existence and the decisive impulse of my striving.

The Problem of Time

These thoughts necessarily lead to the problem of Time, which therefore is inseparable from the problem of Being. Heidegger solves this problem in as radical and revolutionary a fashion as he solved the problem of human existence. In this essay I cannot enter an explicit discussion of this problem, but must confine myself to saying what I regard as the most significant. Heidegger works out a conception of Time which can take the place of Eternity in the sense in which religion understands it. As he exalts finitude over infinity, as he exalts individuality, so he reinterprets Time in such a way that it can take over the function of Eternity. Time thus characterized he calls "authentic." It is that Time which man orders and fills and in which he envisages and performs the task of his self-realization. Man always lives out of the future and remembers the present as his past. Authentic Time therefore does not begin in the past running into the present and issuing into the future. This is the course of the abstract mathematical time of the natural sciences which is usually symbolized by the quasi-spatial straight line stretching out endlessly. Physical time has no past because it has no future and no present. It implies a mere succession of points in which some are earlier, others later.

Insofar as I understand my death in this way as a meaningful conclusion of the time that is allotted for my life, this finite time does not point beyond itself. My life is rounded and closed by the anticipation

of death and thereby made meaningful in itself. My lifetime becomes as it were an infinite finitude or a finite eternity. Heidegger unifies in that way the finiteness and infinity of Time. He fills finitude with the meaning of infinity and thus interprets it as being self-dependent and self-sufficient. Limitation does not mean defect and loss, it rather means form and exaltation. Authentic Time is the time given to me to become an "authentic" person, or rather it is the time I give to myself in order to become "I myself." Heidegger says "I am thrown (*geworfen*) into the world in order to design myself (*mich ent-werfe*) and to carry out this design (*Entwurf*)." Finite life embraces therefore the only possible and the only desirable eternity, namely, Time taken as a whole in which I can achieve or fail to achieve the meaning of my existence. There is no other time called eternity which would begin beyond my finite lifetime.

From this, the way in which Heidegger announces his personal and philosophical religion should be clear. This religion achieves by a most peculiar interpretation a fusion of our life and the beyond on the level of this life. It is a religion that combines immanence and transcendence within immanence by elevating temporality to the rank of eternity. No thinker of the past has ever done this, although there are some beginnings in Hegel and in Nietzsche. Heidegger is more radical than Nietzsche, particularly because he had undergone a more intense philosophical training—first when he was in a Catholic seminary for priesthood, and later under the guidance of Edmand Husserl. But there is also a deep difference of a religious nature between Heidegger and Nietzsche. Nietzsche deified life; Heidegger exalts death. Nietzsche knew nothing about anxiety, care, and concern in the metaphysical sense, nothing of conscience and guilt; he was an aesthetic naturalist. Heidegger, on the contrary, knows the dark powers of life and the antinomies of mind. Heidegger says "yes" to existence, but only because he says "yes" to death. Man must have traversed death inwardly before he is able to live a wise and true life. Nietzsche was anti-Christian; Heidegger might be called a "de-mythologizing" Christian if I may use the expression of his disciple, Rudolph Bultmann.

Heidegger and Christianity

The very fact that a Christian theologian could become a disciple of Heidegger without ceasing to be a Christian theologian points most clearly to the religious flavor of Heidegger's vision. There are definite Christian traits in his personal religion, although they are divested of their original linguistic form and transformed throughout. Although it is true that Heidegger's own religion is outspokenly secular and markedly humanistic, nevertheless there is a hidden tinge in it which reminds

us that he was once a man of Biblical faith and that he never completely forgot this origin of his spiritual existence. Although this is true, one has to add that the Christian faith was probably never questioned so profoundly and threatened so dangerously as it is by Heidegger's own religion. Just because Heidegger took over Biblical and Christian overtones, his private religion can seem to rival with and even to be superior to the Biblical message. Just because he cuts the ground away beneath the Christian faith, he undermines it by asserting that the truth and validity of Biblical revelation can be kept even if one dismisses all mythical and mystical elements, and that it is possible to replace the historical message of the Bible by an ontological analysis of human existence. One can even find certain almost monkish traits and peculiarities in Heidegger's religiosity. His hate of all bourgeois conventions, and his inclination to distinguish between the initiates (that is, those who lead an authentic life and interpret death in an authentic way) and laymen (the unauthentic everydaylife people) points to this trait. Perhaps the very emphasis laid upon the anticipation of death is itself inherited from his Catholic past.

Heidegger, like the Bible, is convinced that the everyday life of man is as chaff before the wind, that "to be in the world" means to be exposed to vanity and frailty, that man can never escape either guilt or anxiety, that anguish and despair are his lot, and that ignorance and insensibility characterize the average man and bind him to want and necessity. But, in contrast to the Bible, Heidegger believes that man can rise from this veil of tears by his own effort and freedom, that he can triumph over the vicissitudes and contingencies of his existence through his own strength. In this respect he is ironically an heir of modern idealism, or more exactly, he was this heir when he composed his book, *Being and Time*, and published its first volume. The arrangement of his book and the overt purpose of its author demanded that a second volume would follow the first. However, Heidegger has never carried out his plan, and now it is evident and also admitted by himself that the "designed" second volume will never see the light of day. Immediately after the publication of the first volume, difficulties obviously obstructed the continuation of his original scheme and its consummation. These difficulties could not be overcome, but on the contrary, grew ever greater, so that the whole structure of his system after 1927 was shaken and finally shattered. This inner development of Heidegger's philosophical views is of the highest importance in understanding his own religion, so we must now turn to a careful analysis of his reasons.

II

The title of the book, *Being and Time*, obviously implied the purpose of dealing with the relation between Being and Time. But when we

examine the first volume with the expectation of finding out how Heidegger carried out the program we are astonished to discover that throughout the entire book the concept and problem of Being-as-such is nowhere discussed. Rather the entire inquiry starts from the beginning with the "Being of existence" (*Sein des Daseins*) and also ends with it. By "existence" (*Dasein*) Heidegger understands always *human* existence. If one takes his term "fundamental ontology" at face value, one is led astray. This "fundamental ontology" does not deal with fundamental, universal and absolute Being as it seems to suggest. Heidegger aimed most probably at an eventual theory of this absolute Being when he began to write his book, or else he would not have called it "Being and Time" but "Existence and Time." When, however, he composed his first volume, that special province of Being which we call "human" was pushed into the foreground, not without good reason, so that he no longer spoke of Being-as-such in its universal meaning. Perhaps Heidegger from the outset had intended to raise the problem of Being only in the second volume. However this may be, we do not learn anything about the relation between universal Being and Time in the volume which alone is published. We learn something about this relation only insofar as it is manifest between "human" existence and "human" Time. I suppose that Heidegger, when he wrote his first volume, had not yet sufficiently reflected upon the "Meaning of Being" although he uses this phrase frequently. I guess that he had not yet decided whether or not he should admit any Being that would transcend human existence and could be called truly universal.

In any case, the philosophical development beginning immediately after the publication of the first volume proves that there was no longer a place in Heidegger's existential system for universal Being as long as the position taken in the first volume was kept. In this sense, this volume really contained Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" since, in the last analysis, universal Being and human existence converged to the point of identity. If finitude and infinity are truly reconciled to each other, if death and not immortality stands at the horizon of human destiny, and death itself takes over the function of immortality, if in such a way Time and Eternity are no longer in contrast and conflict but are intrinsically united with each other as authentic Time, if, finally, man is able to overcome his guilt and anxiety out of his own individual power, what indeed can a transcendent Being then still signify? What kind of power and what kind of meaning could universal Being still possess if human existence includes all imaginable meaning in itself and thereby is truly omnipotent? What can Being still imply without ever attaining to that authenticity which characterizes the human self? No wonder Heidegger did not find any function or position for such a transcendent and obviously abstract Being after having exalted human existence as

he had done in his book. No wonder he encountered obstacles when he tried to continue his scheme, since the very objective of his original vision seemed to disappear.

Yet, without any doubt, the first volume demanded a sequel according to the original plan of the whole work. After all, the solution of the problems offered in the first volume was by no means so satisfying and complete as my presentation of Heidegger's thought and as Heidegger's own analysis seemed to suggest. Even if it is true that human existence can be explained out of itself alone, and that it does not point to anything that would transcend its horizon, still some very uncomfortable questions do arise, questions which the first volume did not answer and could not answer. These questions unavoidably postulate something beyond human existence. Although man, according to *Being and Time*, is apparently autonomous and sovereign, yet he is also, even in his authentic self, conditioned and confined in several ways. Man's inclination to turn unauthentic is even less explainable and comprehensible out of his own existence. If man is "thrown" into existence, as Heidegger teaches, these questions must be raised and asked with utmost seriousness: What or Who has thrown him into the world? Whence did he come, even if we assume that he does not go anywhere? What is the origin of his potential individuality? What is the ultimate source of the division between human (*Dasein*) and sub-human (*Vorhandensein*) existence? What does the "*Da*" in the word "*Dasein*" mean if no absolute "*Sein*" is admitted? These and other questions seem to suggest that the "fundamental ontology" is in fact not fundamental at all as long as we confine ourselves to the discussion of human existence and reject any transcendent Being. A second volume therefore should indeed have followed the first in order to answer these inevitable and imperative questions.

The Philosophy of Nothingness

On the other hand, the emphasis laid upon death by Heidegger's thought makes a philosophy of Being very hard indeed if not impossible. Should death really possess the tremendous power and transcendent dignity which Heidegger attributes to it, should death really wield the magic power that challenges man to become authentic, does it not then take the place of the Absolute itself? Would not the transcending Being then coincide with the Being of death? Is death perhaps the entrance door leading not only to the authenticity of the human self, but also to a comprehension of the peculiar inclination of man to become unauthentic? If this question could be answered in the affirmative how should we then conceive of absolute Being? The answer to this all-important question is given by Heidegger in the second phase

of his development: This Being is not, as the "fundamental ontology" had assumed, truly Being, rather it is absolute Nothingness (*Nichts*). This Nothingness alone seems to preserve the transcendent power of an absolute cause of all things including man. All things and all existence arise from the ground of Nothingness and are permanently fettered to that ground. Not a philosophy of Being but a philosophy of Nothingness emerges in the essays of the second phase. This philosophy is a substitute for the second volume.

Heidegger's Nothingness has a wholly peculiar character. It is neither identical with the non-being of the Greek sophists nor with the non-being of Plato or Augustine, nor is it identical with the Nirvana of the Indian thinkers nor that of Schopenhauer's metaphysics, nor is it identical with the negativity of the negative Christian theology nor with the supper-essential nothingness that Eckart put in the place of God. Heidegger's Nothingness could best be interpreted as a kind of Universal Death which determines the horizon not only of the individual human life but also of all things and of all events which enter Time and disappear after a while, which, as it were, have their own time at their disposal or which take a definite time but are eventually swallowed up by universal Nothingness. As the individual man, according to Heidegger, gains his full individuality only by making himself sovereign and free through the anticipation of his death, so also is the individuality and uniqueness of all things produced and assured only by contrast to the universal Nothingness. Everything that is is what it is only on the foil of what it is not. It emerges out of the absolute ground of Non-being and is, as Heidegger's phrase runs, "held out against it." This metaphysics of Nothingness is the consistent conclusion of the former philosophy of death. I think one has to admit that Heidegger could not have gone any other way if he wished to continue the direction of the first volume in his solution of the problem of universal Being.

In his small pamphlet entitled "What is Metaphysics?" (first published in 1929 and frequently republished since then) Heidegger says, "Being is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of existence held out against Nothingness." In this sentence it is quite clear that the metaphysics of death has been transformed and enlarged by Heidegger into a metaphysics of Nothingness. Metaphysics, he argues, is not a science that can be severed from human experience and human behavior. It is not purely theoretical but presupposes the awareness of death as the limitation of human existence, and cannot be separated from this awareness, for every being and every thing that is is essentially penetrated and permeated by universal death, that is, absolute Nothingness. All single entities, including man, exist only insofar as they stand out in relief against Nothingness, or, as Heidegger expresses this idea

in a phrase hardly to be rendered into English, insofar as Nothingness "actively negates" (*Nichten*) them, just as man himself is "actively negated" in death. In a simple phrase, which does not fully render the depth and originality of Heidegger's thought, I could say: It is the transitoriness of everything that exists which defines it as existent. It exists only inasmuch as it positively negates Nothingness but in the end is caught up by Nothingness and annihilated.

Changes In His Thought

Heidegger, however, could not long remain content with this solution of the metaphysical problem. After all it is not only paradoxical but outright absurd that the positive should be reduced to a negative and that Non-being should be substituted for Being. Heidegger left it to the more superficial and more rationalistic Sartre, who had been his disciple in the second period of his development, to construct an extended and explicit system out of the metaphysics of Nothingness, while he himself turned away from it and sought for a new and better solution. The second period of Heidegger's development was not of long duration and in fact lasted only a few years. Already the essay entitled "Of the Essence of Truth," written in 1930 and published in 1943, shows a new development. Being begins to attract his attention again in its positive meaning. It is identified with the Truth that makes us free. Our mind, Heidegger argues here, is like the clearing in a wood where no trees prevent the light of the sun from shining upon the ground. We are the more free the more this light shines forth in our mind. It is the light of Being-itself that clears and frees us.

Heidegger speaks of human knowledge as a window that opens to the light. He now interprets the *Da* in *Dasein* as the openness through which the hidden Being of Truth breaks in, for this Being is essentially hidden and makes itself felt as hidden in our mind. Man is free insofar as he is able to contemplate the Truth or insofar as Being manifests itself as Truth. The essence of Truth, therefore, is founded in the last analysis upon our freedom. Freedom thus is not true freedom when man assumes that he can find the Truth in himself: "Man is presumptuous to the degree to which he measures everything that is by his own measure." This sentence obviously contains a self-criticism of the author of *Being and Time*. The new turn is most forcefully revealed in the postscript which Heidegger added to his writing "What is Metaphysics?" in a new edition (1934).

III

In this postscript, Heidegger bluntly asserts that Nothingness lives as Being. It is a new "mood" (*Stimmung*, a word very much favored by Heidegger) which seeks expression. Now it is beyond any doubt

that Heidegger's innermost and, I should say, most "authentic" concern was religious from the beginning, although this religiosity is not that of the believer of a positive religion but that of a seeker and inquirer who himself is most keenly aware that our whole epoch could be called an epoch of religious seeking and inquiring. We live in a period, as Heidegger puts it, in which Being has not yet arrived at its destination so that we could possibly know it; it is still "on the way" and, therefore, metaphysics must also be "on the way." Therefore, Heidegger does not by any means believe that he has found his goal, but he does believe that he approaches the goal and that he is now taking an extremely momentous step. Only now his "fundamental ontology" begins to be what it was intended to be: Contemplation of Being-itself. However, at the same time, the style and method of his thinking also begin to change fundamentally. He no longer regards it possible to know and to demonstrate a concept of Being in a logical and scientific way. It is a tragic irony that the same man who emphasized most passionately and vehemently at the beginning of his career the scientific character of philosophy, now has come to see that the solution of the supreme problem can neither be comprehended nor expounded in a scientific form. Although Heidegger does not explicitly speak about this fundamental revolution in his thought, every careful reader of his writings can easily discover it. The fact that Heidegger did not write a second volume nor any book of a similar concentrated energy but instead published only one pamphlet after another, one essay after another, or lectures and letters, shows the tremendous shift in his development. Even his last book, *Holzwege* (*Blind Alleys*), is merely a collection of essays.

The personal tragedy of the collapse of scientific energy and achievement in Heidegger's development is, however, partly mitigated by the consideration that it is not his own lack of intellectual efficiency which brought about this resignation but the necessity of a true insight. The moment Heidegger fully realized that the problem of Being necessarily leads the thinker from the philosophic realm to that of religion and faith, he could not fail to change his whole position and attitude. In this respect, it is not Heidegger's personal misfortune, indeed it is not the mishap of any singular thinker that urged him to revise his whole undertaking, but rather it is the absolute limit of thought itself facing the supreme objective of all thinking which brought about Heidegger's "failure" and his new start. The revolution in his development illuminates the fact that the thinker as thinker cannot deal with the supreme objective of thought in the same way and on the same level that he deals with everything that lies below this objective, where it is possible to treat human existence in a rational and logical fashion. Even language

itself refuses to retain the same tone in which science speaks of its objects. That which is above the human sphere cannot be touched upon except in an ecstatic and poetical, in a symbolic and metaphorical mode of speaking. One might therefore conclude that the tragedy of the collapse may finally be reverted into a blessing.

Heidegger's language was somehow religious and poetical from the very beginning, but the strict methodical appearance concealed this overtone. In the first period the religious enthusiasm and inspiration was an undercurrent only. They were disciplined and held in subjection as long as Heidegger did not directly attack the ultimate problem. Only now the power of methodical concentration and organization breaks down, because a higher power breaks through his words and assures recognition for itself against the will, as it were, of the scientifically minded thinker. Only now the metaphorical and mystical overtones of his thought rise to dominate the whole sphere of his philosophical utterances. The religious element in its competition with scientific thinking prevails in an ever increasing scale. Heidegger's own religion now discloses itself without any restraint and with the greatest vigor. We will see that this religion is not all too far from the official religion which has been confessed by Christendom for two thousand years.

Heidegger's New Position

In the third and last phase of his philosophic development Heidegger voices feelings which clearly remind us of many central themes of Christianity. Man, he says, is called upon by Being-itself and thereby he experiences "the wonder of all wonders," namely, "that there is something at all and not nothing." Being is not a concept of thought nor is it produced by the human mind, rather "authentic" thinking is itself an event within Being. The metaphysical anxiety facing the "horror of the abyss" where Nothingness dwells is metamorphized into an awe which "enlightens and shelters that place where man can stay at home as in his abiding abode." Nothingness represents what is uncanny and sinister in man's existence. Being, on the contrary, is the very root of man's mind and soul. Therefore, he can take asylum in it, and he can remain in Being because it remains itself. One has the impression that Heidegger, stirred by an irresistable nostalgia, longs to go back to a community in which he can find spiritual security. Only when man is rooted in the Ground of Being, and when he is certain that Being protects him and makes him safe can he gain the courage to encounter the horror of Nothingness and his own death. Whereas before death and Nothingness were the absolute, the ultimate, the transcendent, whereas death secured and guaranteed to man the resolute joy of his authentic

existence, now absolute Being and the awe which springs from its contemplation inspires in man that attitude which gives him security and true humanity.

In this new faith, Heidegger's philosophy is definitely determined by Being: "Thinking responds to the claim of Being." "Being generates the emergency which culminates in the freedom of sacrifice." "In this sacrifice that hidden thankfulness, which alone knows how to honor the graciousness of Being in surrendering itself to man, comes into the open so that man may make himself a guardian of Being." "Original thinking is the echo that resounds the favor of Being." "This echo is the human response to the Word uttered by Being-itself with a silent voice." I have quoted all these sentences because they can better testify to the religious intensity of Heidegger's new position than any other presentation could have possibly done. What is Being if it graciously approaches man and admonishes him to become its guardian on earth so that the purity and majesty of Being can be felt and kept? What is Being if, as Heidegger insists, "it brings to man the nobility of a poverty which conceals the freedom of the sacrifice as its true treasure"? In what spiritual sphere do we find ourselves when we hear words like these and try to discern their innermost meaning? Is it still the philosophical sphere in which we move, or is it not rather the realm of pious devotion to the Author of all that is, the realm of thanksgiving and of religious sacrifice and poverty? The Logos of the ontology seems to be converted into the Logos of Christian revelation, into the Word that was in the beginning and through which all things have been made.

Let us examine more illustrations for this astounding and significant turn—Heidegger speaks of the "Word" out of which "the Truth of Being comes." "The contemplation of Being keeps the Word and fulfills its own vocation by caring for the Word." "The thinker says Being, the poet gives a name to the Holy." In a little essay, "Why Poets?", Heidegger speaks of the "inward world room of the heart," where the poet integrates the whole of existence. In our time this whole is threatened by disintegration. We live in a period in which there is no salvation. The Holy is hidden. Even the path towards the Holy is disrupted. Man in the technical age is alienated from, and hostile to, the Holy. In such a period the poet alone can save us. He possesses the "sanctifying power." The poem "celebrates the original unity of Being which is never destroyed because it is indestructible." The poets "bring to mortal man what is divine." Through the poets, Being-itself may arrive even "in the midst of the world night." The word of the poet is the "temple of Being."

Although Heidegger aproaches Biblical devotion in many respects, in others the distance from it is considerable. Although his religion in some passages reaches a prophetic height, it does not cease to be

the personal confession of a thinker hovering between philosophy, poetry and prophecy, comparable to the sermons of Meister Eckart.

Further Changes

The introduction which Heidegger has added to a new edition of his essay "What is Metaphysics?" in 1951, even surpasses the position of his earlier utterances which still preserved somehow the presumption of philosophic procedure. Now he frankly declares "the objectifying thinking of metaphysics can never attain to the essence of that Truth which announces itself in Being." Even the pre-Socratic philosophy, to which Heidegger frequently referred after 1935 in trying to identify his own metaphysics with that of Parmenides or Heraclitus, is now categorically dismissed as insufficient and incompetent, because it tried to comprehend Being without its essential relation to man. In this respect Heidegger sticks consistently to the thesis defended in *Being and Time* that human existence in contradistinction to all other existing things is itself Being. Since it is Being, and not only something that exists, absolute Being can open itself to it: "The term 'existence' (*Dasein*) was chosen in order to characterize the realm in which man as man lives by pointing to both the relation of Being to the essence of man and the relation of man to the openness of Being."

In this same introduction, we find an interesting passage about the interconnection of ontology and theology. Greek ontology, Heidegger maintains, was from the start basically theology. Only for this reason could Christian theology use Greek philosophy for its own purposes. But Christian theology, he says, transformed the ontology of Being into the ontology of *a* being by interpreting the Biblical God as Being itself. The Biblical God is essentially an existing being, and is not that absolute Being which is the ontological ground of everything that exists. The way leading through Nothingness to Being should not be allowed to lead to something that exists, even if the existent were the living God. Otherwise all the labor of his "fundamental ontology" would have been in vain. We would then go back to Leibnitz, and this, he says, we must not do. "Being-itself is not God, it is not the Author of the world. Being-itself is more than anything that exists."

This conclusion is somehow bewildering. Insofar as it is gracious to man and favors him, as Heidegger insists, is Being still conceivable as impersonal? Is Being, insofar as it is inclined to man and opens itself to him, insofar as it appoints man as its guardian and makes itself his home,—is Being, thus comprehended, not more than the content of a universal idea? Indeed, is it not more than what the term "absolute Being" suggests? Is it not furnished with attributes which we can and should ascribe to the living God alone?

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Morality and Moralism

John C. Bennett

There is one conflict of thought that has appeared in every period of Christian history. It began when some persons started the rumor that Paul was teaching that men should sin that grace might abound. It is represented in the New Testament by the contrast between Paul and James. It was the conflict that divided Augustine and Pelagius, and later it was a major factor in the Protestant Reformation. More recently it has been an important part of the debate between the "Liberals" and the "Neo-Orthodox". I think that it has given rise to more polemical sermons in James Chapel than any other subject of which I can think. It is the conflict between those who stress the dangers of moralism and those who stress the claims of morality. It is the conflict between those who stress the priority of divine grace and those who stress man's responsibility and his need of self-discipline and of corporate discipline.

In part, the conflict is the result of mutual misunderstanding. In part, it arises from the fact that both sides in the argument are afraid of different things. Those who stress moral discipline are most concerned about the sins of weakness, the sins of inertia, of personal disorganization and irresponsibility. Those who stress grace and the limits of morality are most concerned about the sins of strength, about the more subtle sins of the well-organized, effective man who is righteous according to usual standards but whose righteousness so easily leads to hardness and self-sufficiency and a lack of charity. It is natural for those who fear the hardness of the righteous man to concentrate on the sins of the successful, moral, middle-class, Anglo-Saxon Protestant —quite a disreputable combination, as we all know!

There could not have been a conflict of this kind for so many centuries unless both sides were concerned about real issues. Those who put their emphasis on grace and the dangers of moralism are right in calling attention to these things:

1. To the lack of proportion morally that has generally accompanied Christian emphasis on law and discipline;
2. To the fact that no moral exhortations can provide the power to obey them—often they create only despair;

3. To the deep roots of the moral life in the soil of faith and motive, and to the truth that on this deep level the sources of self-discipline are themselves gifts of grace;
4. To the peculiarly noxious effects of moral self-congratulation which comes from the sense that we are the ones who are always right, to the fact that the sins of the strong, self-righteous people are the most destructive forces in the world;
5. To the ways in which the highest flowering of the moral life is itself a by-product of the realization that we are loved and forgiven, for humility and the deeper honesty and charity under difficult circumstances depend on what we have received and are not themselves the product of self-discipline.

With reference to that last point, I often think that when the Gospel says that the publican in the parable was the one who went down to his house justified, this meant that he no longer had to defend himself or compare himself with anyone else, and that, for this reason, he was capable of a much higher and more sensitive morality than the Pharisee. But this morality was the by-product of his sense of being forgiven, of his "justification".

These emphases are the most distinctive contribution of the Christian gospel to the understanding of the heights and depths of the moral life, of the more subtle temptations which threaten us on every level of moral achievement. Yet, after all of these things have been said, there remains another danger.

It is the danger that at quite important points our righteousness may fall below what is good in the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees. Here we should not be guided by the stereotype of the Pharisee but think of the good citizen who assumes that there are aspects of the moral life which need direct cultivation, which require both self-discipline and social discipline.

No theologian who stresses the dangers of moralism really is indifferent to this level of morality, but the clichés of theology at third hand may become rationalizations of a kind of moral indifference. Take the injunction of Luther: "Sin bravely"—at times, a popular injunction in recent years. There are contexts in which there is some sense in those words, but the context is highly important! Professor Bainton says of this injunction that "to make this the epitome of Luther's ethic is grossly unfair because it was a piece of uproarious chaffing of the anemic Melancthon, who was in a dither over scruples of conscience. He well knew that his jest would not induce the impeccable Melancthon to jettison the Ten Commandments." (*Here I*

Stand, p. 226). Bainton goes on to say that Luther did sometimes say that an unblemished record engenders the worst of sins, pride, but that the only sins which he "actually recommended as record-spoilers were a little over-eating, over-drinking, and over-sleeping. Such controlled excesses might be used as the antidote to arrogance".

After we have come to recognize that the deeper sources of all morality are gifts, and after we have come to see the dangers that beset the so-called "moral man", we can, for practical purposes, mark out an area within which moral law and moral discipline have an essential place in Christian teaching and in the Christian life. Here are some examples of the morality that does require direct attention: everyday integrity, to be as good as one's word, to be financially responsible —cutting no corners even when the government is involved, thoughtfulness about bills and debts; simple loyalty in personal relations; fidelity and dependability in family life; responsible attitudes toward the institutions that we serve; a sufficiently well-organized life so that we are able to fulfill our responsibilities in all relationships; scrupulous fairness especially where we may be inclined to be prejudiced; a habit of not taking advantage of other people over whom we have power of some kind (many of the saints are especially weak at this point); the prevention of such feelings as professional jealousy from determining basic attitudes and decisions.

There is a kind of dependability that was recently illustrated when a very wise and fine citizen was recalling the fact that over the past thirty years he had made about two thousand speeches and had missed only about three engagements in the entire period. He used his experience to illustrate the great success of our unplanned free-enterprise system in getting people to their various destinations. It does illustrate that but it also illustrates a quality of personal character, of personal dependability that is not outdated. It is a form of thoughtfulness for others. It should not become the one absolute. The Good Samaritan may have missed an engagement. But so far as it goes, it is an important element in character.

There is a danger that in stressing the very solid virtues, we may make morality seem dull, but my purpose has been to stake out an area where morality needs direct cultivation and there are times in the lives of most of us when this area requires major attention.

On a level beneath this area of our moral life and ultimately controlling it, there are motives and impulses and attitudes which do not come through this kind of moral discipline; and on a level above this area there are qualities of spirit, forms of courage, of charity, of humble sensitivity which do not come through self-discipline but through the knowledge that we are loved and forgiven.

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Gangs and the Churches

Arthur L. Swift, Jr.

"Last year almost half a million children came before our courts. A million and a third youngsters got into trouble with the police. The rate has constantly been increasing over the past five years. Those under eighteen years of age committed fifty-eight percent of all the automobile thefts in the country; forty-nine percent of all the burglaries. This was a ten percent increase over 1953 and marked a fifty-nine percent increase in juvenile delinquency since 1948."[1]

The activities of adolescent gangs are a form of delinquency that always has news value. This is natural enough. For the gang has become the dramatic symbol of youthful rebellion against adult law and order. And because the gang is so often a creature of the slums, it is also a symbol of class revolution. This is one reason why these young people are so freely labeled "hoodlums", "bums", "dope fiends", "perverts" and "gangsters". "Teen-age hoodlums" is a phrase so often repeated that it is beginning to be believed that all "hoodlums" are "teen-agers" and all "teen-agers" "hoodlums".

How inevitable it is that the churches should view these gangs as the antithesis of all the Christian virtues! The mass media have ganged up on the gangs. And they have made the bad seem so very bad that the good seems very good and the distance between impossible to cross. Said a former official of the Protestant Council of New York, "The churches of this city are not interested in the problem of delinquency!" He sounded shocked and angry. Yet he must have known how natural this is. The churches stand for righteousness.. They are law-abiding, peaceable, respecters of life and property. In personal habits, of food and drink, and sex and recreation, the people of the churches show a decent restraint. To bring church to gang or gang to church is to perform a miracle in the conjunction of opposites. So it seems to many. And because this ought not and need not be so this article is written. But it is written as a protest not a panacea.

Symbol and Symptom

The adolescent gang embarked on lawlessness is symbol and symptom of too much that is wrong in the world, in your town and mine, in the church and in us, to make a panacea possible. And the protest must be against the ignorance and the indifference and the inertia that lead us good folk to respond to the newspaper's excited exaggerations of gang wickedness with an exaggerated sense of our own righteousness when what is needed is understanding, repentance, and active love.

But in our zeal for social reform, we must not forget that the first and unique function of the church is and must always be the worship of God, to establish and maintain in man the consciousness of God. How else can human life be controlled and directed according to His will? And the history of religions makes it clear that because the ways that best serve any society are felt to be God's will for its members, it has always been a vital function of religion to reinforce and sustain established ways. This has meant both sanction and tabu. And tabu, the negative aspect of religious behavior has, in non-Christian groups, often been unrelenting and cruel. Therefore the only surpising thing about the Christian churches' condemnation of adolescent gangs is their failure to be merciful and humble. They conform to the simpler pattern of primitive belief and forget Hosea and Micah and Jesus.

The gangs are social rebels. And we in the old-line churches are prone to forget that in their history Christians too have been rebellious, law breakers, rabble-rousers who would turn the world upside down. Remembering, we should be more alert to the behavior of protest, not only in South Africa but in our city's streets. Perhaps it is because we Christians recall to mind Jesus and the twelve, and the little groups of early Christians meeting in secret, hated and despised, that we are afraid of small gatherings of protest against established ways. We know how power-packed they sometimes are.

But this surely is false analogy and sentiment. The social meaning of a group derives from its controlling purposes. The gangs of New York and the early Christians served different masters, the evil and the good. Yet this view over-simplifies complexity. Paul listed not a few evils within his new formed churches. And there are qualities of loyalty and courage and self-sacrifice in even the criminal gangs.

Let us look realistically at the young gangster's reasons for joining a gang. The first reason is so obvious it is often overlooked. He joins a gang because he is a human being who, being human, finds association essential to normality. The gang is a group. Without experience in a group the individual cannot become a social being. We are all the creation of the groups to which we have belonged. For most of

us the family into which we were born has been the social womb within which our personalities were shaped. It gave us love, protection, direction, purpose, and neighboring families reinforced its gifts. Then came the friendship group of playmates, our peers, who learned with us the hard lessons of how to get along with others in a larger than family society. What these friends thought of us sometimes made more difference than what the family thought. And the two groups together became our social world. We all remember how that world grew, sometimes slowly, sometimes in sudden jolting spurts of new experience and how in joy and pain we grew with it, finding new and different groups to test and challenge our abilities to conform and to be separate.

Familiar as it all is, this is said here for a purpose, — to drive home what should be obvious and never is, — ganging is normal and necessary and right in its essential features. What is wrong is the ways in which family and community warp and twist the normality of its expressions. In inner-city "slum", in plush suburbia and wherever else the family has ceased to have unity and dignity and a core of shared devotions, the friendship group, the play group becomes a growing child's one refuge from loneliness and inner chaos. If he is lucky in his pals, if from *their* families they distill a reasonable and ordered kind of living, then the play group may save his sanity. Even the rejected child, the child from the broken home, from the home where parents are in tense, unending conflict may thus build a measure of self-acceptance and security. But when the gang itself is constituted of refugees from chaos, when there is no neighborhood of shared values, standards and ideals, the gang must build its own. And it will build them out of frustration, bitterness and hate. It will build them strong enough to stand against foes, staunch enough to give security, aggressive enough to give status or what it calls "rep".

Here are brief quotations from an unpublished autobiography of about 15,000 words written by a one-time gang member after he had climbed to the security of a good education, marriage and a business of his own. This is an average rather than exceptional story of ganging. But it gives the feel of the thing from the inside as no newspaper account and no scientific analysis can.

A Case Study

"The writing of this report," he says in the introduction, "has been a painful reminder that growing up in a New York slum, in an area dominated by gangs, is a terrible experience, stamping all those who enter into it. The experience is one of frustration and bitterness. To those who say that a gang is "entered into" I take great exception. These boys were driven into association but never into inter-action;

they never understood one another, nor did they attempt to do so. There was no humaneness, no sympathy in anything they did to or for one another. In the two years I was a member of the "Kikes" I do not remember one act of kindness on the part of one gang member toward another. Ours was a social code completely at variance with that of society in general. It was a jungle code and its rules were simple: Always look out for yourself; Get what you can NOW. Simple rules, but terrible in execution for 12 year olds, all of foreign extraction, marked by the origin of their parents, hostile to their parents' harsh ways. Denied acceptance by any other group, they felt themselves cast-off and unwanted by all.

If my conclusions are not optimistic it is because I have returned to the scene of the action and have seen the same gangs reproduced there, engaged in the same activities, but with a greater sophistication. Narcotics replace the more innocent wine of my acquaintance; the sex relationships are on a more sadistic level. The problem is the same, the progress has been nil."

He begins his story:

"The area under study in this report is a neighborhood in Brooklyn known as Brownsville and Ocean Hill, the latter district wandering off into the Bedford-Stuyvesant area, the period 1934-36. Two or three families lived in each apartment. The buildings were 8 to 10 family, three-story affairs and congestion had increased. The Slavic neighborhood was considered to be the most disorganized of the 3 closer neighborhoods, (The Jewish, the Italian, the Slavic), and the unanimous opinion of the populace was that this was due to the drinking and attendant disorder. On Saturday nights we would congregate in the streets to watch the fighting, since hardly a week-end passed without a riot call. The convenient location of the Liberty Avenue police station often brought these affairs to a quick close, much to the disappointment of the children in the neighborhood. We boys of the Jewish gang considered the "Polacks" lucky because they were able to do things we could not do, such as stay out later, come and go without any need to account for their time. The girls were included in this scheme, and their availability made them important factors in the sex life of the other gangs. The gang which dominated in this area was, of course, "The Polacks," composed of about 18 boys, ranging in age from 10 to 16.

In the Italian area was a numerically larger group living mostly in older, two-family, wooden frame houses, with the landlord on the premises. This group was a stranger and more unfamiliar group to us, they had stronger family ties, we never spoke to their girls, saw their parents only in the streets and felt a kind of awe in the presence of their strange customs. We felt closer to the Slavic group because

most of the Jews in the area came from the same section of Europe. We went to classes with the Italian boys but studiously avoided each other after school hours. Even in school the ethnic line was drawn. Teams were mostly, if not entirely, of a single nationality. The Italian gang was much more violent than the Slavic gang. They engaged to a greater degree in criminal activity, organized raids on the nearby market, on the wholesale market area, pilfering from the Long Island Railroad yards, assisting bootleggers, and, occasionally, burglary, Upon occasion they robbed parked cars, breaking the windows with a padded hammer and stealing from the glove compartment, or forcing open the trunk with a crow-bar. As a consequence they had more available cash than any of us and looked down upon us with contempt as "junkies," as we derived a good deal of our own income from the sale of junk and waste paper.

The Negroes outnumbered all the nearby gangs, in a ratio of at least 5 to 1. We were frightened of the Negroes and with good cause. The area represented an ever-present threat. We looked upon it as an area of disorganization and license. Only the most courageous of any gang would dare enter it, except in an organized mob for revenge. This was sometimes done by older gangs who operated from automobiles as they were not safe on foot. We projected a good deal of sexuality upon the Negro boys and listened, believingly, when they told us of their exploits. Most of them carried contraceptives and pornographic literature and showed these things to us as evidence of their masculinity. We had no other way of securing information about the Negroes and we accepted every vicious story, every foolish boast, every sensational headline as being definitive of the Negro population.

In the Jewish area our gang consisted of about 12 members, in a loose confederacy, drawn together more out of a sense of need of protection than out of choice. The gang was there when I moved into the neighborhood and it was soon apparent that I had to have an association with some protective force or face the hostile Italian boys alone. There was no indigenous criminality except for the few bookmakers and bootleggers, but they were not considered to be criminals and they operated quite openly. There was an area of concentrated criminality about a mile away where the Murder, Inc., mob, later to acquire such fame, held court, but little of their fame carried over to us. We were to a large degree a backwater community and we felt it.

No gang in a poorer community can long survive without a successful economic core. An adolescent may have personal expenses far in excess of his parents' own expenses. Clothes are probably the greatest expense and the social pressure to dress well is terrible. Not to be

"sharp" is a social error leading to oblivion and sharp clothes are expensive. Clothing is outmoded before it is worn out. Then there are expenses for dances, gifts and occasional treats. I am deliberately avoiding dealing with such unorthodox expenses as narcotics, liquor and prostitutes but I feel confident from my own experiences and observation that a factual report would indicate that the personal expenses of a group of adolescents would be in excess of $10 per week each. One of my earliest jobs was carrying beer from a speakeasy to parties nearby. It was common for children to be entrusted with the carrying of certain sealed packages as children were less likely to be stopped and interrogated by the police. The police were not noted for the gentle treatment they meted out to us and it was not unusual for them to beat us across the "derriere" with their clubs or black-jacks. Our hatred of the police was increased by the fact that they took graft from the local bootleggers and bookmakers, shook down the pushcart peddlers and prostitutes and made no attempt to hide these activities. Several times the police chased us when we were disturbing bookmakers taking bets on the telephone!

The most exciting times were spent in the several abandoned buildings in the neighborhood. We protected ourselves from the police by boarding up all the possible entrances big enough to admit an adult and had several "emergency" exits just big enough to permit us to squeeze through. The windows were covered by tarred paper torn from the roof and the light was cut off from the streets and we used candles for light. Here we were at last free from all pressures, from our parents, the police and rival gangs. The building also served as a center for sex activity of the gang. We kept pornographic literature, reading salacious stories and keeping pornographic comic strips. Upon several occasions Polish girls were brought into the hide-out, usually when we had enough money for a party.

When I left the neighborhood the entire group was quite a bit older and the escapades, in and out of the hide-out, took a more mature turn and I later heard that one of the girls became pregnant and the boy involved held up a gas station to get $75 for an abortion.

During the Italo-Ethiopian war trouble developed between the Italian and the Negro gangs in the area. In school after lunch one day it was apparent that something was going to "blow." I noticed that several of the boys had knives tucked into the sleeves of the leather jackets then the fad. It was at the gym that the explosion took place. A volley ball game was in progress and a Negro and and Italian wrestled for a fallen ball, a fracas ensued and before anyone knew what was going on a Negro ran from the group, blood streaming from his slashed face. Knives were produced on both sides and the teacher ran into the group, shouting for them to put down their knives.

I could not run out of the gym as fights were in progress at both exits. I retreated toward the wire-enclosed roof but a Negro caught me at the door and hit me with the sawed off end of a baseball bat. By that time groups were fighting in the lunchrooms, hallways and schoolyard. The assistant principal rushed into a group of boys fighting in the yard and grabbed one of the larger boys who had a knife in his hand, punching the boy ful on the chin. The assistant was promptlystruck on the head with a billard cue and he fell senseless on the ground. A call was sent out for the police but before they arrived pandemonium reigned. The police arrived in scores armed with riot guns, machine guns and the rest of their paraphernalia. Most of our weapons had disappeared and no one seemed to remember exactly how the fight had started. Ambulances had accompanied the police and at least a score of the students required medical attention.

Patrol cars cruised the streets of the neighborhood, keeping the streets clear and a pleasant air of importance replaced our former fear for we were now the object of so much activity on the part of the police. That night the neighborhood crawled with reporters and police. The activity of the reporters was particularly flattering and we all invented suitable tales of gory deeds done in the battle and insisted that the school administration was keeping the facts from the press."

He wrote in conclusion, "We accepted all groups as being more or less equal. Call them groups, gangs, or what you will, we accepted them as one and the same. This is one of the important lessons: That youngsters will choose their groups in the neighborhood and participate with that group in those activities indigenous to the area. It matters little what the appetite of the individual may be, he is limited by age and lack of mobility to this area. These activities are determined as much by the historical and ecological factors as by the desires of the members."

Challenge and Opportunity

Analyze this story and you find much to condemn, in spite of condensation and expurgation. But you surely find as well occasion for pity and for a sort of personal shame. Here are average boys and girls, Slavs, Italians, Jews, Negroes, thrust together into an adult world of harsh confusion. So many different cultures, so many different ideas of right and wrong, so much struggle and so little love! Out of all the studies that have been made, from all the legislative investigations, showing itself between the lines of the newspaper stories, appears one common cause of delinquency. One factor seems always present in city and suburb and in country town, in poverty and wealth, in

white and in Negro communities wherever delinquency and ganging flourish. It is the absence of shared concern, of agreed-upon standards, of any feeling of neighborhood responsibility. And in the family the same principle holds true. The disorganized neighborhood, the disorganized family, lacking unity of purpose and of will and any strong pride in belonging, creates the kind of situation in which children too often fail to find any plan to grow by, any star to steer by and in the confusion of conflicting pressures and needs become lost.

In areas thus affected the gang offers the protection of the combined strength of its members, gives youth something to belong to, and a set of standards to which he must conform. There is little love there and much violence. It costs in personal surrender to win membership in such a group. But to too many youth there is no live alternative. And in too many so-called neighborhoods, the pressure to join and the patterns of gang behavior are a part of the social setting, continued from year to year. They are something the young child looks forward to as his proper role and activity in the society he is to share. And so the habits of gangdom become a mold into which the young unstructured life is poured. And to crack the mold is very difficult.

But from the viewpoint of the Christian Church all this is challenge and opportunity. And it is unfair to conclude that the influence of Protestantism has been entirely insignificant. True, nothing that has anywhere been done has reversed the national trend toward youthful lawlessness. And the Church must share the blame for this. But surely there is also the strong influence of religion upon the vast majority who as Senator Kefauver said "are fun-loving, honest and talented; the 96 or 97 percent of our kids, the best that any ever had, God-fearing, anxious to get an education and to assume their responsibility as citizens"!

Remembering Jesus' chief concern for the lost, we cannot make this reassuring statement an excuse for inaction. We must do more than we have done and do it more intelligently: — programs and activities in our local churches for and *by* youth, the courage to open our doors to alien groups that need what we can offer, the civic pride and sensitivity to support through taxation and citizen effort the struggle for better schools, more well trained teachers, and more parks and community centers where folk young and old can learn under skilled leaders to use their leisure in creative ways; but, even more fundamental and inescapably our responsibility as churchmen, to rebuild the family altar in the homes of our people as symbol of a shared devotion to the spiritual and ethical values of the Christ we all would serve.

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[1] Senator Kefauver, in opening a Hearing before the Senate Sub-Committee for Juvenile Delinquency on November 8, 1955.

American Christianity As I See It

David I. Mitchell

It has been a real privilege to be accepted within the fellowship of the Churches of American Christianity. Since September I have been living within the Union Seminary community and have shared the worship, and the fellowship of the several denominations represented among students and faculty. I have been invited to Episcopal and Lutheran, Congregational and Presbyterian, Baptist and Methodist Churches to be the guest preacher at Divine worship or the guest speaker to adult or youth groups. I have joined in seminars on various aspects of the American Church, doing most of the listening as is only right for a visitor to do. And in class room discussion and student groups I have shared in thought and debate with a cross-section of what can be considered as the cream of young American Christian life. Within the fellowship of the twenty-four Fellows in the Program of Advanced Religious Studies I have had a chance of testing my reactions to and thoughts upon American Christianity against those of people drawn from other parts of the world. And this should save my reflections from showing any personal bias and thus give a measure of objectivity.

Yet, I confess to a sense of inadequacy. It is natural to expect that the Churches I visit would be the churches that show virility in this modern age, that are aware of the development of the ecumenical spirit, that contain people who have had some fellowship with churches overseas. I question whether I have come into contact with the average congregation. I have not conversed much, if at all, with the ordinary pew-member, living within his community and venturing forth five or six times a week to his daily work. Is the ordinary American Christian aware of the Church outside the borders of the United States, or indeed outside the borders of his own city, or indeed his own congregation? How much does he take to heart the beliefs and

practices of his denomination? Is his religion formal or vital? I can give some answer from my contacts at Union, and in the interested churches that have asked for visitors from overseas. But I am not at all sure that I have put my hand on the pulse of American Christianity. I have walked with the advance guard, I am not sure that I have slogged along with the rank and file of the army.

What of fellowship with the many numerous sects of which I am told so much? In the Caribbean I have spoken with people from the Church of the Nazarene, and the Church of God, the Pilgrim Holiness and the Pentecostal Assemblies of Christ, the Seventh-Day Adventists and the Jehovah Witnesses. I have seen no sign of any activity in New York. Perhaps I knew not where to go? It still remains that these groups were plainly in evidence at home. Here I must hunt for a slight trace of them.

What of some of the more esoteric groups? I have noticed several buildings carrying the legend "Jesus saves!" But I do not know just what happens there except from hearsay. What of Father Divine and of the Psychical Society, of Theosophists and the Bahai, of the Christian Scientists and the many faith-missions that spread their thin tentacles over the face of the globe?

I have talked with the staff of the Seminary, and many of the men come from my part of the world. They are my fellow-countrymen, and their roots lie within the Caribbean: they are not typical Americans. The postman and the policeman, the school-teacher and the social worker, the politician and the labor leader, the businessman and the merchant, the landlord and the broker, the banker and the civil servant, the bus-driver and the sanitation department worker, the nurse and the doctor, all these and more are the people of America and I have just barely scratched the surface in any acquaintance with them. They are America and what do they make of religion — Protestant, Catholic or Jew? I may reflect on reports, statistics, surveys. But I was asked to reflect on my experience of American Christianity. It will be clear that I am bound to be one-sided in any account for lack of the experience of the attitudes of the many groups, classes and denominations I have just mentioned. I am conscious of my weakness and ask that what I say be considered in the light of the above.

The Conduct of Worship

It seems good to take those things that are superficial and reflect the American way of doing things. So I begin with a word about the conduct of worship. Most of the overseas people I have spoken with confirm my view that there is an amazing use of candles, lights, gold crosses on what once were called communion tables but now

altars, robes and vestments. So too the wholesale transfer of European religious architectural styles to adorn the heights of the Hudson river or the long avenues of Manhattan! What would the forefathers of Methodist and Baptists, Congregationalists and Presbyterians say of this rush to emulate the external ritual and practices of the Catholic branch of the Christian Church without the inward theological and dogmatic concepts that brought them to birth? Are candles lit, does the Eternal light burn just because it is aesthetic and good religious tradition? Or is there a belief that there is a symbol, in such use, of Him who said "I am the light of the world."? Indeed, more than a symbol. Is the belief held that at the altar of the churches of Protestant America there is somehow the Real Presence of Christ? I cannot get over the feeling that the balance swings in favor of the first view.

Shortly after I arrived I found myself worshipping at Riverside Church one Sunday. The prayers and the sermon were a real source of blessing. Yet there was a sense of show. Everything was done on a magnificent scale. As I walked down from the gallery at the conclusion of service I overheard a woman say to her husband. "It must be wonderful to be able to preach and sing to such a large congregation." Thinking of what had been said during the sermon, I came down to earth with an unpleasant jolt. Was that what got across to his woman? not how magnificent was the God we worship, but how magnificent was Man's worship of God! This subtle swing of focal interest from God to Man seems to me in danger of creeping in. Particularly do I feel so when I see the arm of organist or choirmaster waving in the air beating time. To see the half-hidden hand waving like a small snake from behind the organ console, or to watch the heaving shoulders of a minister of music as he or she stands behind the communion table (or altar!) keeping time for the choir always prompts the question: Are we here to let the wings of song waft our spirits into the presence of God, or to witness a technically correct rendition of a religious anthem or song?

Yet there is a deep warmth of human friendship and fellowship within such congregations. No perfunctory interest in the passing stranger, but a real acceptance of a fellow-Christian. Everything is done to make the visitor feel at home. The pencil and invitation card in the book rack, the hymnbook and the order of service, they all help both in the fact and the implied attitude in extending the welcome. A question arises in the mind of the overseas visitor who has been accustomed to possess a personal hymnbook and Bible. Does the provision of these in the pew for the use of everyone in the congregation somehow imply that possibly the Bible and particularly the hymnbook are strangers to the home?

The human sympathy is shown too in the offerings that are made. To many of us it is a revelation that in a service two offerings can be called for, and a generous response made to them. It must be realized of course that the level of income is so different. We are told that the per capita income of America is about $1,200, of Britain $770, and of the Caribbean about $80. Yet there is a willing generosity, and not very much noticeable feeling of compulsive "charity". I have heard several times the enquiry: "We have been blessed in this county, what can we do to help others?"

Prosperity is reflected too in the extensive material plant that is seen even in the smallest church. There certainly is a difference between Christianity here and in other countries. Separate class rooms, pianos, and fittings for the several classes of the Church school are an impossible dream for all but the very largest of overseas churches. This is a great advantage here. For by these means is provided an opportunity for the promotion of the fellowship of the congregation. Church chicken suppers may often draw a smile, but at the table there is given one more chance to the Christian community to grow in fellowship. This is all too needed in the technological age where community is displaced by the mass. This is not to say that Church suppers naturally result in deeper Christian fellowship, but that where there is existing already the fellowship there is provided the opportunity to deepen it.

Material abundance is reflected too in the amount of work performed by a salaried staff, where in other countries volunteers would have to do most of the work. This gives a student an opportunity to learn while he earns, for in Britain and the Caribbean I have found that any monetary reward could not be depended on to provide the resources for study, but was in the nature of a token only.

Denominationalism

This now leads into the deeper issues that underlie the American scene. First, we notice the facile transfer of both pew and pulpit holder from denomination to denomination. There has risen up an idea that there is no depth to the theological thought of American Christianity. And those of us who are deeply grounded in the beliefs of our denomination and can recognize the significance of the divergent viewpoints are amazed that one can come from the Reformed Church and join the Episcopal Church in seminary and do field-work in a Congregational Church! Can one person so easily swallow the implications of the presbyterian system, the apostolic touch of the episcopate, and the virtues of the individual congregation's autonomy? Or is there a real indifference to the meaning and significance of the theological insights of the various denominations?

One explanation might be the respect for the rights of the individual so firmly implanted within American culture by Puritan New England, and reinforced by the notion of man's essential goodness, which underlies so much of the modern educational system developed by John Dewey. If by nature we are good, and it is only the influence of a malign environment which leads the human race astray, it easily follows that a human being linked with God can do no wrong. His judgment must be respected. His personality cannot be coerced or even challenged into conformity. The validity of any doctrine then rests not within its relation to and explanation of the whole universe, but primarily on its acceptability to the human being. America has thus led a healthy revolt against "blind" orthodoxy but at what seems to be the tragic cost of pitting individual human experience against the experience and wisdom of the race. The Apostle's Creed then becomes valid not because of what it says to and for the Church Militant and Triumphant, but because the individual boy or girl, man or woman has accepted it. We are reminded of the story of the policeman who found a little boy sobbing bitterly early one evening in a city-street. "What's wrong, son? Are you lost?" "No," replied the boy tearfully, "I'm not lost, but home is!" There is value in this constant flow of people from the pulpits and pews of one denomination to another, if even only as a witness against the horrible self-righteousness of conservative European Christianity — the group prayer of the Pharisee: "Lord, we thank thee that we are not as other denominations are. . . ." But is this corrective given because of the wrongness of the Pharisaical attitude, or because of the respect for and preference for the judgment of the individual?

Individualism

This leads us to consider the relation between Church and State. From all that I can gather, all that a man needs to do to establish a congregation is to gather a group, elect a board of trustees and an official board, establish a congregation, and get incorporated in law. The congregation then has the power to call and ordain anyone to the office of the ministry. Do we see here yet another example of this underlying principle of respect for the beliefs and rights of the individual? Yet real democracy is not a democracy of individuals splintering off at their merest whims and fancies, likes and dislikes; but it is "government of the people, by the people and for the people." And here it seems to me there is the recognition that man is not just an individual, but an individual in community. I believe that the intense liberalism and subjectivism of early 20th century Christianty is changing to recognise the place of the community and of man in

community. I have heard much talk of the group dynamic, and of the confrontation of the individual with God in the community — the Encounter!

This is having something to say to American Protestantism in this question of the color problem. I believe there is a growing recognition of this Christian Community. It was put this way to me by an American Baptist. He had met one of the missionaries of his denomination who was under severe tension. One of his young friends from Nigeria was being sent to America for graduate studies. "I have heard of the color-bar. Will I be able to go to communion in the churches that sent missionaries to claim me for Christ?" And the missionary had to confess that this African brother could not share the Lord's supper with the very people who had in the Lord's name brought him to an understanding of the very experience of the Supper. The distress of that missionary, and the dilemma of his soul to me is a sign of the recall of American Christianity from being the sign and symbol of the individual's condescending acceptance of the faith with a dogged proviso that his individual and personal right of judgment be his unreservedly and unalienably, to the realisation of the community of God living in and transforming the world. Though the pace be slow, yet the signs of change are there, the signs of this community where "there can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female; for ye all are one in Christ Jesus."

Book Reviews

ETHICS, BY DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955. 340 pp. $4.00.*

This book would have interested us even if it did not reveal the superb merits which it does reveal. Its author was at one time German fellow at our Seminary. He taught in our Summer School in the summer of 1939, just before the war broke out and he returned to Germany because he declared that it was impossible to stay away from his country when Christians had to make the difficult decision of wanting the defeat of their nation for the sake of their Christian civilization or of preferring the victory of their nation at the price of their civilization. He conducted an underground Theological Seminary for some time. He was involved in the plot on Hitler's life, having come to the conclusion that tyrannicide was a Christian obligation when facing the evils of Hitler's tyranny. He was executed just before our army liberated the prison in which he was incarcerated. He thus became one of the martyrs of the Christian faith in Nazi Germany.

Bonhoeffer was a very able and subtle theologian when a student with us. He was strongly influenced by Karl Barth and this influence is also apparent in his work on Christian ethics. Like Barth, he is strongly Christological in all his approaches to ethical problems. He also has the same eschatological emphasis. But Bonhoeffer was no mere disciple of anyone. He had both an original mind and a questing spirit. For a time, he, a German Lutheran, even thought of visiting India, in order to learn from Ghandi. The evidence of a trenchant mind and a robust piety are on every page of his book.

It is interesting that his eschatological emphasis does not make for irresponsibility in the ethical sphere. Those who wait for the coming of Christ, he declares "have a tremendous responsibility. The hungry man needs bread and the homeless man needs a roof. The dispossessed needs justice and the lonely man needs fellowship. . . . To give the hungry man bread is to prepare the way for the coming of grace." Yet it may be a weakness in Bonhoeffer's approach that he can not justify the keeping of the love commandment except as a preparation for the preaching of faith. "To give the hungry man bread is not the same as proclaiming the grace of God to him; and to have received bread is not the same as having faith. Yet for him who does these things for the sake of the ultimate and in the knowledge of the ultimate, the penultimate does serve the ultimate."

This is genuinely Augustinian; but one wonders whether he is quite Scriptural in fulfilling the simple love commandment of the Lord. At the same time, one is grateful that Bonhoeffer does not insist on particularly vivid acts of "witness" to the resurrection as Barth sometimes does. He finds his witnessing opportunities in all the simple obligations of life and there is, therefore, a shrewd common sense in dealing with the stuff of life. His Christian realism prompts him to some shrewd observations on ethical calculations in terms of motives and of con-

sequences. "An ethic of motive or mental attitude is as superficial" he declares, "as an ethic of practical consequences. - - - What right have we to refuse to take account of the fact that a good motive may spring from the dark background of human consciousness and unconsciousness; and that it may lead to dubitable consequences. - - - But the question of consequences also leads into the mists of the future, where there are no definable frontiers." He would have loyalty to God and the kingdom of God to cut through all speculations about motives and consequences.

He thinks that obedience to Christ expresses itself in terms of four "mandates." He defines these mandates as "labor, marriage, the church, and the world." The mandates seem not to be quite equal in scope; and the mandate for the world is rather too broad for precise definition. One might cavil with some aspects of his treatment of ethical issues; and one may question whether he comes to grips with the structural and institutional aspects of political ethical problems. But if there are defects in the book, they pale into insignificance beside the accomplishments of a thoroughly elaborated system of biblically-founded ethics.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

THE GIFT OF POWER, BY LEWIS JOSEPH SHERRILL. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955. 203 pp., $3.00.*

"What man has lost today is himself. He is his own lost continent. Until he finds himself, all else is lost."

"In proportion as a man reaches true self-understanding and true self-knowledge he is rendered the more capable of sustaining undistorted relationships with God and true firsthand knowledge of God."

"The Christian religion can teach men how to receive a gift of interior, spiritual power sufficient to enable them to cope with the gift of exterior, physical power which has been granted."

These sentences well define the central thesis of the latest in the steadily lengthening shelf of volumes of notable helpfulness which Dr. Sherrill is giving us in his climactic years as scholar and teacher.

This book fetches a wide compass. Although not explicitly so organized, its eight chapters divide naturally into four parts. It makes its start, as the title and the sentences quoted above promise, from the wellworn theme of "the predicament of contemporary man" with two chapters of profound diagnosis on "The Human Self" and "Threats to the Self." The author draws heavily upon his extensive knowledge both of the premises and literature of psychiatric and related writing and of the inner distress of individuals as revealed through his own wise and effective counseling. For most readers, this will doubtless prove the section of most immediate appeal. Then follows what is, in some respects, the fulcrum of the argument, for it is Dr. Sherrill's conviction that the "gift of power" comes mainly through "The Christian Community." At this point, attention is focused directly upon the philosophy and practice of Christian Education in three chapters dealing with Revelation, the Bible and symbols. Here are found perhaps the most original suggestions, though of more limited interest. Lastly, the discussion returns to its starting-point and the positions developed in the body of the book are brought to bear upon "Changes in the Self" and "The Dynamics of Becoming.'

As already indicated, this volume embodies both a program for Christian Education and a treatise on personal self-fulfillment. The former breaks new ground in charting a philosophy and practice in fidelity to the reorientation toward the Bible and theology which has

characterized theological education in these latter years, a reorientation of which Dr. Sherrill himself has been a chief architect. Students and alumni who have had the privilege of participation in his classes will recognize a full and balanced development of the principles which have there been set forth. Those who are less concerned with this program will find immense suggestion for their own living in the wider context in which it is set.

Dr. Sherrill himself has requested that this review should raise questions rather than offer praise. That is not easy for one whose principal response is gratitude for so comprehensive and competent a treatment of themes of central importance for the church and its ministry today.

My own most troubling query is directed, not to his exposition for which I feel only heartfelt admiration, but rather to the perspective which dominates current thought and of which this book is among the soundest and most constructive illustrations. Of all the ailments which afflict contemporary man, possibly the most widely prevalent is exaggerated self-preoccupation. That this tendency is aggravated by the literature of self-fulfillment and by the vogue of psychological counselling, few would question. We confront the contradiction: an age which magnifies the individual and his personal concerns gives us a generation lamentably lacking in personal self-reliance, maturity and normality. Is there not need for a fresh exploration of the psychological and therapeutic as well as spiritual truth of a principle which stands at the very heart of the Christian understanding of man in Jesus' most oft-repeated dictum, "He who seeks to save his life shall lose it. He who loses his life for my sake and the Gospel's shall find it?"

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, Vol. II, BY RUDOLF BULTMANN, TR. K. GROBEL. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. 278 pp., $4.00.*

The translation of the second part of Bultmann's *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* makes available for English readers the complete work, of which the German edition appeared in 1953. The second volume continues the presuppositions which guide Bultmann's interpretation of the New Testament: (1) He offers a New Testament theology which is written from the eschatological perspective; a conspicuous theme if compared with early twentieth century theologies. (2) Properly speaking Bultmann does not present a unified New Testament theology, but several New Testament theologies, since he emphasizes the variety in Christology and soteriology of the several New Testament books. In this method Bultmann follows the liberal "historical-critical" school, in sharp contrast to earlier presentations which treated New Testament theology under dogmatic headings and in contrast as well to the unified theology-of-history approach of Stauffer. (3) With Stauffer, Bultman does not confine himself to the New Testament canon, but treats the post-apostolic New Testament books in conjunction with the "Apostolic Fathers" in order to achieve a better view of the development toward the Early Church.

This volume is divided into two parts: the Johannine theology, and the development toward the Ancient Church. The treatment of John, combining the Gospels and Epistles in a single view, is probably the most magnificient and coherent piece of composition Bultmann has produced. Placing the background of the Gospel against the world of Gnostic thought—described in his commentary on John more specifically against the background of the Mandean Saviour myth—Bultmann sees the decisive Johannine point in transforming Gnostic cosmological dualism into a dualism of decision. This decision ap-

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pertains to having life out of the sphere of the world or out of God. However the world as such does not stand in a cosmological, but an anthropological, dualism against God. The Kosmos is in enmity against God, not because it is evil in itself, but because "men loved darkness rather than light," i.e., man wants to live out of his own possibilities and securities rather than out of the open future of God. The decision comes about through the Word of the Logos made flesh, the figure of Jesus who constitutes the stumbling-block for the world. The scandal is precisely that the content of God's revelation is not an objective dogma, and that the signs done by Jesus do not point to external manifestations which can be understood apart from His Word. Indeed, the content of God's revelation is only the Word which Jesus proclaims and which brings about the decision of faith, i.e., that He is the eschaton of history.

It must be admitted that in order to achieve this unified picture of the Johannine world as a world of the eschatological Word which through Jesus evokes decision, Bultmann is forced to handle the editorial knife conspicuously with respect to the sacramental aspects in John 6 and the futuristic eschatological aspects. What is disturbing about this is not the admission of an editorial hand in John, but the casualness with which such editorial processes are asserted, especially since Bultmann must know that the sacraments (cf. O. Cullmann, *Early Christian Worship*) and the futuristic eschatology represent *the* Johannine cruces. A mere reference to his John-commentary on these crucial points seems insufficient. Furthermore, one has to be critically aware of the fact that the preponderance of Gnostic background—which surely fits in with an existential interpretation—obscures the Jewish and especially the Old Testament background of the Gospel. And is it due to a lack of appreciation for the Spirit as *communal* love that so little attention is given to the concept of the Church, the bond between Christ and "his own"?

The second part, the development toward the Ancient Church, is also under the eschatological theme: How is the mature Christian faith of Paul and John understood by the later writers of the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers? Each author is considered as to his understanding of the relation of the indicative and the imperative, i.e., his understanding of the paradoxical tension of "between-ness," of the "already" and "not yet." This paradox expresses the realization of standing within the new era of eschatological fulfillment in the midst of the ongoing historical process of the old order. Except for the Deutero-Pauline literature —Colossians, Ephesians, the Pastorals— and for Ignatius, where this existential dimension of Paul and John is still grasped, none of the other writings reach this level. All transform Paul's existential eschatology into a merely chronological eschatology in which the tension between salvation here and now and the eschaton is broken down. For example, this breakdown is expressed in the notion of baptism as forgiveness of previous sins, i.e., sins committed until the time of baptism. This chronological understanding is accompanied by Judaizing or Gnostic trends—Judaizing in the sense of concepts of merit and perfectionism, Gnostic in the sense of ascetism and the development of a double morality.

Here serious questions arise. Isn't Bultmann imposing too rigid a dogmatic category on the New Testament? Does this method lead to an understanding of New Testament theology and if not, is it anything else than an assertion that New Testament theology is a failure as soon as we move beyond Paul and John? Bultmann's hermeneutical method is seriously to be questioned on this issue. Isn't it the first task of a historical theologian to understand the authors with which he deals? Is there a sympathetic understanding of the historical setting and various circumstances of the

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writings? "Vorverständnis" has become here an exegetical tool rather than a presupposition which should be transformed by the literature under consideration. In fairness to Bultmann it must be said that he has less scruples on this point since the historical fact of a delayed Parousia does not constitute a serious problem for his existential interpretation.

The problem I have with respect to this exciting New Testament theology does not have reference to Bultmann's use of Heidegger's thought, but directs itself to the question whether his existential interpretation of the New Testament with its insistence that it is the Word alone which addresses us and places us in the eschatological situation, does not verge on a Docetic Christology, since it seems to break the historical relation between the Word and the Person of Jesus Christ who *is* that word. Therefore Bultmann can hardly find a legitimate place for the tradition and ecclesiology, since it would break the sovereignty of the *sola fide* according to him. The future task for a New Testament theology lies in developing satisfactory dialogue between faith and the historicity of the Christ-event, in such a way that it avoids the danger both of historicizing the Christian message and of making faith a constitutive-creative category of the Christian message rather than a responsive one. It seems to this reviewer that Bultmann has not been able to escape the danger which this last alternative entails.

JOHAN C. BEKER

PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, BY WILL HERBERG. *New York, Doubleday & Co., 1955. 320 pp., $4.00.*

If you want to understand the present upsurge in religious activity, this book is required reading. With a relish and wit that must make his adversaries quail, Mr. Herberg tears off the veil of piety and reverence that surrounds the present religious revival and exhibits its theological nakedness in unforgettable ways. He argues that what appears to be religious is in reality a sociological phenomenon, an effort of third generation immigrant groups to find status and locale in the midst of the sprawling American society. The identification that comes most readily to hand, which has the advantage of being highly "American" and yet reminiscent of the traditional past, is the family religion. Americans who used to be identified by ethnic and national background (He's a German", etc.) are now tagged by religious labels ("He's a Catholic.") The theological content of the "revived" religions, however, turns out to be appallingly thin and superficial. Mr. Herberg calls attention to the mystical connotations that have gathered around the word "faith" so that it is "faith" (a human quality) and not God that commands loyalty and confers assurance. Incidentally, it is probable that the evangelical emphases of the dominant American Protestant groups helped enormously to develop this American predilection for thinking of religion in terms of feeling rather than in terms of theology. Herberg argues, however, that "faith in faith itself" is a mark of all the major religious bodies in America in the present revival. This "faith" turns out to be, of course, a vague optimistic assurance that our American moral virtue will ultimately be rewarded and vindicated by Divine favors. Mr. Herberg is right in showing how much interfaith activity and interest centers in this faulty idea rather than in the authentic Biblical religious experience — judgment, death, repentance, forgiveness, newness of life.

It it not meant to detract from the value of this book in the least to point out that Mr. Herberg has omitted for the sake of his argument a whole area of religious revival, which to some of us seems a great deal more significant than the numerical accretions to membership which commands his interest.

We refer to the intellectual and theological revival, which in Protestantism at least, actually preceded the revival in numerical strength. Mr. Herberg has a wide experience on college campuses, but one is obliged to question whether the contemporary revival of interest in religion in that quarter is quite as devoid of theological content as he implies. Would it not be accurate to say that two religious revivals are going on simultaneously — the one which Mr. Herberg here analyzes with marvelous insight and penetration, and another one which he sometimes seems to forget entirely, which wrestles with deep issues of ultimate importance and has resulted in a surpising recovery of intellectual prestige for religion in academic circles? As a matter of fact, one is appalled at the prospect of a greatly expanded Church whose faith has been so diluted by the "faith in faith itself" that it no longer bears much resemblance to historic Biblical religion. Unless the "religious revival" of a Constantine (may we read "Eisenhower"?) is accompanied and corrected by the "religious revival" of an Augustine (may we read "Niebuhr", "Tillich", etc?) the prospect is bleak indeed.

JOHN M. KRUMM

THE CHRISTIAN AS CITIZEN, BY JOHN C. BENNETT. *New York, Association Press, 1955. 93 pp., $1.25.*

This book by John Bennett is one in a series entitled World Christian Books under the editorship of Bishop Stephen Neill. The series consists of brief books by recognized leaders in World Christianity on important aspects of Christian faith. It aims to make available to the layman the best thinking of Christianity on subjects ranging from the Bible to modern science.

Dr. Bennett's book is an admirable statement of the position in Christian Ethics which he has done so much to set forth. Christian faith, he argues, has inescapable moral implications. Its view of God, of love, sin and man all have fundamental moral implications. However, it is impossible to say in advance of the specific historical occasions what these implications will be. Indeed, it is the part of responsibility to realize that new occasions teach new duties, and thus to respond freshly and relevantly to each new problem. The American reader of the book will be impressed with the variety of situations faced by Christians in different parts of the world to which the book alludes.

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Successive chapters deal with the Christian's social responsibility, with the movement from Christian faith to political decisions, with problems of political authority and political structures, and with the issues raised by Communism. The final chapter deals with the perils and possibilities of Christian action in the political realm.

The book, while it presents nothing new (it is not designed to do so), is an admirable summary of the responsible liberalism in social ethics for which John Bennett has become well known. It is written with lucidity and adequacy of thought which have marked all its author's writings. It is in a word, a kind of Reader's Digest summary of John Bennett's ethical philosophy.

The appearance of a popular book of this sort is evidence of the growing ethical maturity of the World Christian movement. A generation ago this book would not have been written, much less popularly read and understood. We wish for *The Christian as Citizen*, as well as for other World Christian Books, a wide and thoughtful reading.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

SEX IN CHRISTIANITY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS, BY WILLIAM GRAHAM COLE. *New York, Oxford University Press*, 1955. 329 *pp.*, $4.00.

The author of this book, now the Chairman of the Department of Religion at Williams College, has written a stout volume. He has examined the primary sources of the Old and New Testaments, the Catholic Fathers, the Reformation theologians Luther and Calvin, and the contemporary Protestant thinkers in comparison with contemporary Catholic thinkers, and the classical and contemporary psychoanalytic writers such as Freud in the first instance and Horney, Alexander and Rado in the present scene. In each instance he gives a faithful exegesis of the original sources and then gives a critical reaction to the author's point of view in terms of an overhall perspective of his own.

The overall point of view of Cole is that the essential strand of Christianity is joyful and positive in its affirmation of the sexual constitution and needs of mankind. The Biblical emphasis upon eschatology left a negative reaction to marriage and sex which was later turned into an asceticism by Greek dualism. However, this is essentially alien to the original Christian-Hebrew perspective and has only recently been restored to contemporary Protestant views of sex. The ground for the restoration was laid by the Reformers especially John Calvin, who paved the way for a more nearly Christ-like attitude toward women. On this Protestant foundation was laid the empirical findings of psychoanalysis and other sciences which have explored the nature and meaning of sex. Christianity and psychoanalysis "agree that sexuality is to be affirmed" that behavior is symptomatic, expressive of the inner heart of man, that love rather than law is the guide of the sexual behavior of man, and that sex is a means of communicating a spiritual relationship of responsible and mature love rather than being a thing in itself. Both take seriously guilt that arises out of man's estrangement from himself, and both devise ways of bringing to pass a "new creature" in which this estrangement has been overcome through an enencounter of love.

The historical data in this book is brought together in an original and highly readable fashion. The author has produced a book that should be a part of the theological and pastoral library of every pastoral counselor. But more than that—it supplies the first serious coverage of the theology of sex from a historical-Christian point of view which I have been able to discover. As such it provides another text-resource for a careful study of the history of pastoral care.

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THE CATHOLIC APPROACH TO PROTESTANTISM, BY GEORGE H. TAVARD. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955. 160 pp., $2.50.*

Father Tavard's brief volume represents a bold attempt of a Catholic priest to build a bridge to the Protestant world. The French-born author is an Assumptionist, now pastor of New York's Our Lady of Guadalupe Church, whose passion for Christian unity is expressed in this book. His aim is to heal those wounds which divide Rome from her Reformation offspring, so that these erring children can find their way back to the Mother Church. However, *The Catholic Approach to Protestantism* has none of the attributes of a polemic. It is as well-balanced a treatment of this touchy subject as has been written from the Catholic viewpoint.

So conciliatory is the volume that it has already caused concern in American Catholic circles. If one searches diligently, he will find the imprimatur of the Bishop of Scranton carefully concealed from non-Catholic readers on the last page of the index. However, since the publication of the English edition, the imprimatur has been withdrawn from the original French edition, published under the title *A la Rencontre du Protestantisme.* The reason given, and echoed in this country by ecclesiastics who "cannot recommend" the book, is that it is "too advanced." What this means precisely is difficult to say. The book is suspect enough so that at least one major Catholic bookshop in New York, J. P. Kenedy and Sons, publishers of the official *Catholic Directory,* has removed the volume from its shelves.

Father Tavard's discussion undertakes three tasks. First, he reviews with remarkable impartiality the development and distinctive characteristics of the most important Protestant divisions: Lutheranism, Calvinism, Anglicanism, and Methodism. In addition, he discusses the miscellaneous sect groups separately—although "sects" is a term widely used by Catholic apologists to include all Protestant denominations.

Secondly, the author deals realistically with the prejudices that exist between the two major Christian camps. While he castigates Protestants for "piling up nasty judgements, mistaken ideas, and ridiculous legends," he also acknowledges that there has been considerable bigotry in Catholic circles as well.

The third and most significant attempt of *The Catholic Approach to Protestantism* is to suggest a strategy by which Christendom could be reunited. Father Tavard demonstrates unusual sympathy for the ecumenical movement, suggesting that it may serve as a mitigating factor against what he describes as Protestantism's "will-to-oppose which itself originates in sociological constellations rather than in deeply thought-out doctrinal principles." The Reformation, he says, might have been avoided altogether if Rome had purified the church and expressed "traditional dogmas in conciliatory formulas."

Now that schism does exist, he warns Catholics that "to grow accustomed to the existence of non-Catholic Christianities would be one of the worst infidelities possible." Father Tavard sees six factors operating among Catholics or Protestants (or both) which may hasten reunion: a theological awakening, a return to the Bible, liturgical renewal, accession of the laity, desire for peace, and the immediate threat of communism. Perhaps one of his most controversial statements, in Catholic eyes, is that the Catholic "apostle of unity has to entertain a wide range of contacts with Protestantism on the levels of culture and spirituality."

RALPH L. ROY

ANXIETY AND FAITH, by CHARLES R. STINNETTE, JR. *Greenwich, Connecticut, The Seabury Press, 1955. 202 pp., $3.50.*

Dr. Stinnette, Associate Warden of the College of Preachers, Washington, D. C., here adds an important book to the growing literature on anxiety. The thesis of the book is that "man alone cannot resolve anxiety. He needs others. He needs community. Even more he needs the kind of community which is sustained by a more than human love." This community is "the community of the spirit." "In loneliness and separation men are forever strangers to one another, forever aliens so long as they try to create community . . . community comes as a gift of God." (p. viii)

In developing this thesis the treatment moves through three parts. First is man's effort to understand anxiety. Here is a discerning presentation of recent work on anxiety, from both the theological and the psychological points of view. Especially useful in this part are (1) the treatment of the relation of anxiety to sex, to hostility, and to culture; and (2) the identification of three kinds of anxiety—"primary" anxiety, which is existential anxiety, or the anxiety of freedom; there is "sinful" anxiety, which is the anxiety of separateness from God, the anxiety of the loss of freedom; and there is "neurotic" anxiety, arising out of disturbed human relations.

The second part deals with "Anxiety and the Christian View of Man." Here the two principal affirmations are that man is created in the image of God, and that man is sinner. The third part is "Toward Resolving Anxiety in Christian Community." Here the author takes up the more constructive side of his thesis, seeing the Christian community as a community of reconciliation and communion. The core of the affirmation here is that "Christianity is a way of living through anxiety by faith." (p. 170)

The book is especially welcome because of its analysis of anxiety, and its analysis of the "Community of the Spirit" as the scene where anxiety can be resolved in the sense of being "lived through by faith." His tendency to separate "secular therapy" rather sharply from what the Community of the Spirit can achieve, will leave a sense of unrest in not a few readers, who may fear that man thus regarded is still being parcelled out among the specialists. It must be said at once that not all will feel this concern. But even if the concern is well-based, one must go on at once to say that Stinnette is working on the growing edge of a fresh approach to a profound predicament of man, and what he is saying must be heard both with appreciation and with respect.

LEWIS J. SHERRILL

The Library of Christian Classics:

Vol. III. AUGUSTINE: CONFESSIONS AND ENCHIRIDION, EDITED BY ALBERT C. OUTLER. *Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1955. 423 pp., $5.00.*

Vol. VIII. AUGUSTINE: LATER WORKS, EDITED BY JOHN BURNABY. *1955. 423 pp., $5.00.*

Vol. XVIII. LUTHER: LETTERS OF SPIRITUAL COUNSEL, EDITED BY THEODORE TAPPERT. *1955. 367 pp., $5.00.*

The three new volumes of *The Library of Christian Classics* published during the last year represent significant contributions to the whole series. The two volumes devoted to Augustine complete the Augustinian section. They are both very well translated and skillfully edited. Professor Outler had the more agreeable assignment, namely to make available the *Confessions* and the *Enchiridion.* He has made the most of it and has produced a book which, I predict, will be much sought after in years to come. His version of the *Confessions* compares very favorably with earlier ones; it is admirably done. Professor Burnaby had a more difficult task, namely to make available texts representing the work and thought of the

later Augustine. He has chosen to translate the last section of the treatise on the *Trinity* (chapters VIII, IX, X, XIV and XV), the tract on the *Spirit and the Letter* (so important for the thought of the Protestant Reformers) and the *Homilies of the First Epistle of St. John.* The first work represents Augustine's treatment of the major theological problem of the ancient church, the second one his anti-Pelagian thought, and the third one his refutation of the Donatists. Some people will regret that the whole book on the *Trinity* is not made available to them, but they get the nub of the argument in full (and excellent) translation, and in clear summaries of the parts that could not be included. One could wish for fuller explanatory notes of the texts. Yet this criticism (if it is such) is in part invalidated by the adequate general introductions. In these Professor Burnaby, the author of one of the best books on Augustine (entitled *Amor Dei*), proves himself a master of the interpretation of Augustine.

The volume of Luther's letters is an exciting publication. It shows Luther in a light in which only few have ever seen him, that of counsellor to all sorts of people in some kind of distress. Some of Luther's most famous and most beautiful letters appear here for the first time in English translation. Professor Tappert has shown great skill in making a really representative selection. His translations are excellent, and the explanatory notes are just right. I trust that this volume will find many readers. They will be grateful for an introduction to Luther, the man of earthly wisdom, warm humor and daring faith.

WILHELM PAUCK

AN EXISTENTIALIST THEOLOGY, BY JOHN MACQUARRIE. *New York, The Macmillan Company,* 1955. 252 *pp.,* $3.75.

As Karl Barth shocked and renewed Protestant thought in the period after the first World War, so Rudolf Bultmann in our post-war decade has been at the center of a comparably portentious theological development in Europe. Until now there has been in English no exposition of the fundamental—and most unusual—feature of Bultmann's thought: the way he has conceived his theology of the New Testament on the basis of the insights and categories of Martin Heidegger's atheistic existentialism. In *An Existentialist Theology* John Macquarrie (who is Instructor in Systematic Theology at the University of Glasgow) fills this need; and initiates extended commentary in English on Bultmann's work, which has hitherto been discussed only in the more limited terms of demythologizing the New Testament. This volume, incidentally, is one of five in a new series, The Library of Philosophy and Theology, of which two other volumes, Bultmann's *Essays* and *subject and Object in Modern Theology,* by James Brown, should be noted here, for they contain much that bears on the discussion of existentialist theology.

The author's chief intention, and appropriately for the first effort on the subject, is exposition of the thought of the two pivotal thinkers. But neither his aim nor his evident sympathy with the theological approach he describes prevent him from expressing many critical judgments and reservations, and these are given real persuasiveness by a clear, conscientious and methodical style.

In form, Macquarrie's book reflects a natural division found in both Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and in Bultman's *Theology of the New Testament* (Vol. 1): the first half compares the phenomenological analyses made by both writers of the actual, "inauthentic" state of human existence; while the second half presents a similar point-by-point discussion of the attainment of "authentic" existence as envisaged in Heidegger's formally atheistic system and in Bultmann's version of the Gospel. A presentation as comprehensive and often complex as this cannot be summaized here, but two themes pervading the whole work may be mentioned.

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Macquarrie, it is good to see, is keenly aware not only of the methodological problems of relating two systems of ideas, but also of the misunderstandings and demands that accompany such an enterprise. He clears Bultmann—rather too easily—of the charge of importing "alien ideas into Christian theology and accommodating that theology to a prevailing philosophical fashion" (p. 23). But he finds Bultmann in danger of distorting Christian teaching by over-emphasis of elements in it especially congenial to his philosophical outlook (fallenness, freedom, decision) and neglect of anything that is not so congenial (community, love, hope). The dominating and "far-reaching claim that the philosophy of existence stands in a special relation to theology" (p. 5)—that it is the " 'right' philosophy" (p. 18)—is Macquarrie's as well as Bultmann's, and is the work of the whole book to support.

This claim of existentialism's *special* relation to theology connects such procedural issues with the concrete work of making and validating an existentialist teology. For the claim is based on Bultmann's conviction that the implicit assumptions about the nature of man contained in the New Testament have for the first time been expressed unambiguously and systematically by the philosophy of existence (p. 176). And it hangs equally on the conviction of Heidegger's that a true understanding of human existence is the only basis for passing on to the quest for being in the widest sense (a quest that neither thinker has pursued). Thus the existential theology is an *anthropological theology*—a seeming contradiction in terms—a theology which is really a phenomenology of faith; a theology which can describe with compelling immediacy the decision and choice offered man in the Christ, yet which becomes evasive and mute before the traditional content of theology, God transcendent and eternal.

The weaknesses this reviewer finds in Macquarrie's volume are chiefly matters of omission or of emphasis:

1) Although they are very likely the most important if not the most interesting among comparable thinkers today, the impression ought not to have been given that Heidegger alone speaks authoritatively for the existentialist movement, and that Bultmann alone has created an existentialist theology. The word "An" in the title is therefore to be stressed.

2) No one but Bultmann, however, has written a full-fledged *New Testament* theology based on contemporary existentialism. Too narrowly following the view that "The theologian is the interpreter of the thought of the New Testament" (p. 15), Macquarrie is led to neglect discussing the relevence of existentialist concepts to the doctrines coming out of the Church's later experience (Councils, Reformation, etc.) and to the claims of natural theology; and to fail to criticize Bultmann's limitations in these respects.

3) To answer the question whether Bultmann's interpretations of New Testament key words are justified requires criteria beyond Macquarrie's—the consistency and helpfulness, in its context, of a given existential interpretation. An approach to Bultmann from the standpoint of New Testament philology seems necessary if we are to be convinced that his meanings have been discovered rather than imposed.

But these criticisms, and others like them that might be made, should perhaps be taken only as indicating that one book is not sufficient to assess the stature of Bultmann's achievement, much less the general meaning and possibilities in the historical encounter of Christian faith with existentialist philosophy. This one book, however, is to be highly commended as a model of useful scholarship for what should follow.

ALBERT R. VOGELER

FROM FAITH TO FAITH: ESSAYS ON OLD TESTAMENT LITERATURE, By B. Davie Napier. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955. 215 pp., $3.00.*

This reviewer has heard, from friends attending the Yale Divinity School, of the exciting teaching of Old Testament to which they are treated by Prof. B. Davie Napier. In this book of essays, the rest of us are permitted to have the same treat. Prof. Napier writes vividly, clearly, and with an open eye to the implications of the specifics of Old Testament literature for the theology and faith of the Old Testament. He leads us into a profound awareness of the unity, psychological and theological, of Old Testament faith.

To do this, Prof. Napier has chosen examples of five types of literature, which he interprets in the light of six "central themes and presuppositions of the community of Israel" (p. xvii). These six affirmations are: 1) faith in creation; 2) human sinfulness; 3) Divine judgment, both punitive and redemptive; 4) the covenant faith; 5) the theme of redemption; 6) the theme of consummation. Prof. Napier elaborates upon these six themes in his treatments of Myth (Gen. 1-11), Legend (Gen. 12-50), History (I Sam 12-I Ki. 11), Prophecy (Isa. 1-11, 17-22, 28-33), and Law. In all of these he is concerned to show that "from faith the literature in all of its types came into being. To faith it is all addressed. From myth to law, Old Testament literature deals centrally with the same concepts of faith . . ." (p. ix).

This reader found the first two chapters, Myth and Legend, the most satisfying. Prof. Napier takes great pains to read Genesis as the Israelite community read it. Thus he finds that "Israel understood her own history only in relation to God's creation and preservation of all life everywhere" (p. 24). Myth reveals Israel's understanding of God's relationship to man and the world, and legend shows Israel's self-understanding. Abraham's tension between faith and unfaith illustrates the tension which faced Israel in the Wilderness Wandering; Jacob's tension between human perversity and divine grace shows the problem which plagued Israel from the Conquest to the Exile; and Joseph's imprisonment and rise to power seem to suggest that hope of God's redemption of the earth which grew so strong in the post-Exilic period. No doubt these historical correspondences are a little forced. We cannot make the book of Genesis into a "type" of Israel's history. But the myths and legends of Genesis are profound insights into the mind and heart of Israel, speaking both out of her faith and to it.

Though there is much valuable insight and interpretation in the remaining chapters, this writer was faced with too many uncongenial details to find them as intriguing as the first two. One could wish, for example, that the correspondences of Saul, David, and Solomon to the Garden of Eden, Cain, and the Tower of Babel respectively were expressed somewhat more hesitantly, since, suggestive as they are, they do not quite come across. Isaiah is described as a prophet of doom (p. 175), but two of his major themes are defined as Historical Redemption and the Messianic Hope. These, however, are ascribed to the tradition carried on by Isaiah's disciples rather than to Isaiah's "published" work. But this is only a way of affirming the authenticity of Isaiah's prophecies of weal while avoiding the stigma of saying that he ever really said them. Why not admit both their authenticity and their claim to a place in his public message? Unfortunately, the chapter on Law is the shortest of the five chapters. Porf. Napier recognizes the centrality of Law for Old Testament covenant faith, affirming that it is not consistently opposed by the prophetic movement. But perhaps in his interest in the centrality of Israel's creation faith, he fails to put sufficient stress on the fact that for Israel the Law was the gift of God's

grace which provided a means for redemption. The idea of God as creator in the Old Testament is secondary to the affirmation of redemption not only chronologically (as Prof. Napier says [p. 205]) but also theologically (which he seems to contradict [cf. pp. 23, 203]). This is the central affirmation of Old Testament Law, and it is being increasingly recognized that Law is the Central aspect of the covenant, representing both the gracious gift of redemption and the totality of Israel's response.

For all this quibbling, however, we are in Prof. Napier's debt for being shown so vigorously that the Old Testament is a unity, in spite of and including the fact that it is indubitably diverse. Here is a splendid example of the results and the methods of Biblical interpretation, and this reviewer would urge what St. Augustine was urged: "Tolle, lege!"

EDWIN M. GOOD

THE TELEVISION-RADIO AUDIENCE AND RELIGION, BY EVERETT C. PARKER, DAVID W. BARRY AND DALLAS W. SMYTHE. *New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955. 464 pp., $2.50.*

In the introduction to this volume, Dean Liston Pope recalls that in 1951 the Communications Research Project was launched by the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of Churches to deal with such questions as, "Do religious programs on the air become a substitute for church attendance? Do they reach non-churchmen, and with what effect? Do they provide a valuable service for shut-ins? Do they help to build character, to improve society, to inspire reverence? Most important, do they convey the Christian Gospel faithfully, or is the Christian message distorted or falsified as it passes through these new media of communication?"

480 pages and 113 tables later, the careful reader will realize that four years of research and $70,000 did not provide the answers. The authors, all of whom participated actively in the Communications Research Project, are fully aware of this and make no attempt to formulate precise answers to the oringinal questions. Despite their qualifying statements, however, many of the observations and opinions contained in the report will be quoted by careless readers as allegedly irrefutable evidence in support of various proposals. The proliferation of detailed statistical tables, complete with "confidence intervals," tends to impart an authoritative and definitive connotation to findings which may be only tentative and indicative.

The report, however, does indicate lines of direction and covers considerable ground in pursuit of answers. It is especially valuable because the study was not limited to a single type of research and because the authors go beyond all of the research in reaching their conclusions. The multi-faceted approach of the Project included an interview-survey of a 5% sample of the population of New Haven, Connecticut, an investigation of the attitudes of the New Haven clergy toward current policies and practices in religious broadcasting, a content-analysis of selected religious programs, and "depth" interviews with 59 families.

New Haven was chosen as the laboratory not only because of its accessibility to the resources of Yale, but particularly because of the availability as a research tool of an unusually accurate statistical sample of the total population of the city. There is no assumption that New Haven is a "typical" American community. When it is realized that Roman Catholics in the city outnumber Protestants almost two to one, it must be admitted that the survey used an unusually accurate sample of an unusually atypical situation for a study concerned with Protestant objectives! When it is revealed that Roman Catholics select Roman Catholic radio and television programs over Protestant programs in

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a ratio of ten to one, it can be seen that the atypical distribution by religious affiliation in the city affects many statistics in the study.

Another limitation of the study lies in the definition of certain categories. For example, the only consistently used measurement of church attendance was derived from answers to the question, "What church do you attend?" If the respondent was able to name a specific New Haven church, he was counted as attending that church. Under these conditions it is not surprising that only 11% of the respondents are classified as "unchurched," but it makes almost valueless a category which should have been very relevant.

Content analyses were limited to seven programs, three on television and four on radio. Although buried in an appendix, Julian Hartt's analysis of programs presented by Ralph Sockman, Norman Vincent Peale, Charles E. Fuller and Bishop Sheen, is particularly penetrating.

Probably the most provocative approach undertaken in the study was the conducting of lengthy nondirective interviews with 59 families to explore what role religious programs play, or might play, in the lives of persons and families. Almost 200 pages of the report are devoted to these depth interviews in what is accurately designated a "*non-probability* chunk". Communications specialists will find this section to be worthy of detailed study and a summarizing chapter, "Significance of Depth Interviews for Protestant Radio and Television Policy" makes the major findings readily available to all who are more interested in conclusions than in methods of reaching them.

The various approaches contribute to interesting analyses of network religious broadcasters and their audiences. In most cases, especially with Norman Vincent Peale, both supporters and critics can find evidence to reinforce their prejudices.

As indicated in an earlier paragraph, the authors wisely do not hesitate to go beyond the implications of statistics. In discussing the depth interviews, for example, they admit, "Not all of the conclusions we have reached are explicitly supported by the depth interview material previously presented in detail." A concluding chapter outlining "A Strategy for Religious Broadcasting" includes insights not necessarily traceable to the research. The final paragraph observes, "There is not yet on the horizon of religious broadcasting the program that will compare in "success" with the mass evangelist of earlier days. The danger is that there will be. The danger is that some creative genius will develop the program that is so "successful" by the standards of the commercial users of the media that the fundamental purposes of the Christian Church will be ignored or denied . . . In this field as in any other there is no spectacular substitute for the responsible ministry which sees each individual human being as a child of God and speaks to each heart in terms that are relevant to its condition."

The authors also include a statement which could well serve as a corrective for attempts to misuse or misinterpret the findings of the entire study: "The most critical and sensitive spot in the ethics of mass communications, we believe, is in the use of these media for the manipulation of people . . . a fundamental policy of Protestantism is respect for the integrity of the individual—his right to make free and honest decisions in the light of the best judgement of which he is capable and his personal understanding of the faith he holds to. The sanction against manipulation, we further suggest, extends specifically to the manipulation of people for what is presumed to be their best interest. Here is the danger for religious groups using the mass media."

In focusing attention on such issues, this volume serves an important purpose.

JOHN W. BACHMAN

FREEDOM'S HOLY LIGHT, BY MERRIMON CUNINGGIM. *New York, Harper & Bros., 1955. 192 pp., $2.75.*

FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, BY A. MERVYN DAVIES. *New York, Abingdon Press, 1955. 253 pp., $3.50.*

These two books on the relation of faith to freedom have one basic emphasis in common. Merrimon Cuninggim writes that "all freedom is religious freedom," while Mervyn Davies affirms that "true freedom . . . is the freedom to obey God." But beyond that, these volumes are almost entirely different. *Foundation of American Freedom* is a summary of the contributions of Calvinism to the shaping of American democracy; it deals with the period from Calvin to the Constitution. *Freedom's Holy Light* is largely a study of American church-state relations; it focuses on the meaning of the term "the separation of church and state" from its rise to the present.

Mr. Davies has read widely in the literature relating to his theme, and has set down the results of his study in a lively and readable book. Men, ideas, and events march swiftly through his pages, all bent on showing how Calvin and the Calvinist movement ". . . laid the foundations of thought, culture, and society out of which American freedom grew" (p. 215). That such a book on such a theme should come from the pen of a journalist and a layman is itself a significant and hopeful sign of the times. The work is marred, however, by some serious oversimplifications and injudicious claims. It seems that one can study the rise of democracy and find how important Calvinism is to the story, or that one can examine the history of Calvinism and find that it has contributed much to democracy, but that the attempt directly to study the Calvinist contributions to democracy leaves one oscillating uncomfortably between two worlds. But if this volume serves to dramatize an important theme and leads to further reading in the works of such men as Hudson, McNeill, Miller, and Nichols — and perhaps even Calvin — it will serve a useful role.

Dr. Cuninggim is convinced that ". . . complete separation is an inaccurate rendering of the American way of dealing with church-state relationships" (p. 84). He would like it if the phrase "the separation of church and state" could be given up, but lacking that, he would hope that Stokes' distinction between "antagonistic" and "benevolent" separation could be widely accepted. For he insists that American thought about "separation" has focused too heavily on its "restrictive" or negative side, and not sufficiently on its "enabling" or positive side. He combines historical analysis with pointed

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reviews of the relevant Supreme Court decisions (Everson, McCollum, Zorach) and trenchant criticisms of other writers in the field (Parsons, O'Neill, Blanshard, Butts, Pfeffer). He believes firmly that the American principle of the relationship of church and state stresses *both* organic disconnection *and* sympathetic association between the two. He cites such authors as Bates, Corwin, F. E. Johnson, Pike, Pope, and Van Dusen in support of his moderate position. He declares that "sympathetic association between religion and government" does not mean that the state can indulge in sectarianism. But how can our government express "sympathetic association" *except* in relation to "sects" — unless it take J. Paul Williams' rather dubious way out and create a religion of its own? This book is certainly not the last word in a "great debate," but it is a clarifying and helpful word indeed.

ROBERT T. HANDY

A THEOLOGICAL GERMAN VOCABULARY, BY WALTER M. MOSSE. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955. 148 pp., $2.50.*

The author of this small volume has been introducing a long line of theological students at Union, Princeton, Yale, and Drew to the mysteries of the German language in order to enable them to qualify for advanced studies. All who know Mr. Mosse respect him as an enthusiastic and conscientious teacher. As such he presents himself also in this dictionary. It must be unique and probably has no equal in literature. It leads the student to the basic theological words and introduces him at the same time to the German Bible (or at least to some of its most beautiful passages). Its use will not provide the neophyte with a complete set of keys to the language of Schleiermacher or Barth, but it will give him courage to go on looking for them.

WILHELM PAUCK

Book Review Contributors

Reinhold Niebuhr is William E. Dodge, Jr., Professor of Applied Christianity . . . *Henry P. Van Dusen* is President of the Faculty and Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology . . . *Johan C. Beker* is Instructor in New Testament . . . *John M. Krumm* is Chaplain of Columbia University . . . *John A. Hutchison* is Professor of Religion at Columbia University . . . *Wayne E. Oates* is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Southern Baptist . . . *Ralph L. Roy* writes extensively on religion in America and is a Ph.D. candidate at Union . . . *Lewis J. Sherrill* is Skinner and McAlpin Professor of Practical Theology . . . *Wilhelm Pauck* is Professor of Church History . . . *Albert R. Vogeler* is Book Reveiw Editor of the QUARTERLY REVIEW . . . *Edwin M. Good* is Instructor in Old Testament . . . *John W. Bachman* is Associate Professor of Speech and Director of the Audio-Visual Program . . . *Robert T. Handy* is Associate Professor of Church History

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

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

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